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QUASI CONTRACTS IN SALES CASES
QUASI CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY IN THE
LAW OF SALESt
By ARTHUR ANDERSON*
INTRODUCTION
T HIS article falls into three divisions -
First: A demonstration that there are a great many situations
in the law of the sale of goods1 where the seller or the buyer is
given quasi contractual recovery against the other. That is, that
many of the rules providing for a recovery by a buyer against a
seller or by a seller against a buyer, which ordinarily are regarded
as a part of the body of the law of sales, can also be regarded as
the result of the application of quasi contract principles to the
facts in question.
The reader may well say that he knows already that a seller or
a buyer sometimes is given quasi contractual relief. But it is
believed that he may be surprised at the number and variety of
such situations and at the frequency with which courts actually
have been granting such relief in the last twenty-four years.
Second: A demonstration that the courts in granting quasi
contractual recovery in a sales case usually have not described it
as being quasi contractual. The relief actually given, in the
situations described hereafter, is believed to be quasi contractual,
and in some of the cases cited the court designates the recovery as
being in quasi contract or uses language belonging to the terminolo-
gy of quasi contract. In the great majority of the cases cited,
however, the court does not designate at all the type of recovery
given, or at least does not describe it as quasi contractual.
Third: A discussion of certain incidental matters arising out
of the first two parts of this article, and an expression of some of
the writer's views concerning the general subject matter of quasi
contractual recovery in sales cases.
*Assistant Professor of Law, De Paul University, Chicago.
#The writer received valuable criticisms and suggestions in the prepara-
tion of this article from Professors Harry A. Bigelow, George G. Bogert,
William W. Crosskey and Malcolm P. Sharp of the faculty of the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School.
"In speaking of "the law of sales" or "the law of quasi contract" the
writer in each case is referring to the general body of law commonly
named in this way. This is done for convenience and without any belief
that they have definite boundaries.
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The method used in this article to demonstrate that there are
a great many situations in the law of sales where quasi contractual
recovery is given, is to state, in general terms, 2 the rule of the
law of sales to the effect that under the given facts the buyer or
the seller, as the case may be, can recover from the other, and
then to state that this recovery is quasi contractual. There is
usually no discussion of what the law of sales is in each fact
situation, nor is there any discussion of the applicable rule of
the law of quasi contract, but rather the writer adopts what the
authorities have already said.3
As to most of the situations listed hereafter, it is expected
that there will be general agreement that the plaintiff is entitled,
according to familiar rules of the law of sales, to the recovery
granted, and also that the recovery so given is in accordance with
the familiar rules of the law of quasi contract. One of the con-
tributions which it is hoped that this article will make is to call
attention to the surprising variety of situations in which the
courts in sales cases are giving quasi contractual relief. It is
hoped that the "sales scholar" will get a new point of view towards
his field and that the "quasi contract scholar" will have an oppor-
tunity to observe his principles operating in transactions involving
the sale of goods.
The particular method used to collect the material listed below
was to make a careful search through all of the reports of the
American courts and of the common law courts of the British
Empire from 1912 to 1935, both inclusive, for cases where a seller
or a buyer was given quasi contractual recovery against the other.
The year 1912 was chosen with the fact in mind that Professor
Woodward's treatise on Quasi Contracts was published in 1913,
2The rules of the law of sales are stated in general terms and
the countless variations, exceptions and modifications, to which a general
statement is subject, are not mentioned. It is hoped that the reader
will understand that this was the writer's plan throughout.
3The Uniform Sales Act, Williston, Sales, 2d ed., Williston, Contracts
and the Restatement of Contracts are principally relied upon for the law of
sales; Bogert's Commentaries on Conditional Sales (1924 and 1935 Supple-
ment) and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act are principally relied upon
for the law of conditional sales; Woodward, Quasi Contracts, the Restate-
ment of Contracts, and the Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment, Tent. Draft, 1935, and Proposed Final Draft, Part I, 1936 are
principally relied upon for the law of quasi contract.
The Proposed Final Draft of the last named Restatement was approved
at the annual meeting of the American Law Institute in May, 1936. Pro-
fessor Edwin W. Patterson, one of the American Law Institute advisers
on this restatement, has written an exceptionally interesting and valuable
article on the Restatement in particular, and quasi contracts in general, in
(1936) 1 Missouri L. Rev. 223.
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and with the hope that there might be some use for a collection
of cases decided since that time, even though the cases related to
only a small part of his field.
The article does not purport, then, to list all the possible situa-
tions where a seller or a buyer might be given quasi contractual
relief against the other, but only the situations actually litigated in
appellate courts from 1912 to 1935. For that period, however,
it does attempt to list every situation litigated in an appellate
court in the United States, and in the common law jurisdictions
of the British Empire. The writer, as well as the digest publishers
and the reporters, has undoubtedly made oversights and mistakes,
but the list may be regarded as reasonably accurate.
Other possible situations, not represented by cases, have oc-
curred to the writer and doubtless will occur to the reader, but they
have been omitted under the writer's plan of listing a situation only
when it is represented by an actual case.
Since this article uses the term "quasi contractual recovery"
with great frequency, it is proper that the writer explain the par-
ticular meaning with which it is used herein, and this can best be
done by a short discussion.4
After Slade's Case,' the action of general assumpsit would lie
whenever debt would lie, and to a great extent this use was to
enforce a contractual and not a quasi contractual claim.
General assunpsit was also available, from early times, together
with the action of debt, to recover money due to the plaintiff from
the defendant under a statute or a custom which created a right of
action, and to recover money due to the plaintiff on a foreign
judgment or on a domestic judgment not of record, although in
neither case was there a genuine contract obligation on the part
of the defendant to pay. General assumpsit was also available to
a victim of a tort where the commission of the tort enriched the
tortfeasor, and here again there was no genuine contract obliga-
tion on the part of the defendant to pay. In these three cases, the
plaintiff was using assumpsit without basing his case on a con-
tract-he was suing, as far as the form of action was concerned,
as if there were a contractual liability-quasi ex contractu-and
he was spoken of as suing in quasi contract. It will be observed
4For the historical background of the law of quasi contract, see Wood-
ward, Quasi Contracts secs. 1-9; Restatement, Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, Tent. Draft 1935 pp. 14-18; Thurston, Cases in Quasi Con-
tract 1-23.
r(1602) 4 Coke 92 b.6(1760) 2 Burr. 1005.
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that in none of these three cases was unjust enrichment the gist
of the plaintiff's right of action-even in the tort cases, where
enrichment was a necessary requirement, the gist of the plaintiff's
right of action was the commission of the tort.
Commencing with Lord Mansfield's opinion in Moses v. Mac-
ferlan,6 another use for the action of general assumpsit arose,
which may have existed to a slight extent before that time. This
use was to allow this action where events had caused the plaintiff
to "enrich" the defendant under circumstances where the retention
of the "enrichment" by the defendant would be "unjust" to the
plaintiff. The event might be a mistake or misreliance upon a
contract, or intervention by the plaintiff in the defendant's affairs,
or compulsion of the plaintiff by the defendant. Legal relief was
called for, and the convenient action of general assumpsit was
called upon. Again there was no genuine contract obligation on
the part of the defendant to pay, and again the plaintiff was using
assumpsit without basing his case on a contract-he was suing,
as far as the form of action was concerned, as if there were a
contractual liability-quasi ex contractu-and he was spoken of
as suing in quasi contract.
The four situations mentioned in the two previous paragraphs
were dissimilar, except that general assumpsit was the form of
action. The use of the term "quasi contract" to refer to all four
of them was illogical, in that it collected four dissimilar situations,
but on the other hand, it was logical in that it collected the four
situations where a plaintiff was suing in general assumpsit without
basing his case on a contract.
The term "quasi contract" has had a modern usage as including
all four of these situations, although it also has had a usage in a
narrower meaning as including only the unjust enrichment cases.
The terminology has persisted in spite of the fact that the forms
of action have been abolished under code pleading.
The term "quasi contractual recovery" is used in this article
in the broader of these two senses-it is intended to mean a recovery
of money due to the plaintiff from the defendant under a statute or
a custom which created a right of action, or a recovery of money
by a suit on a foreign judgment or a domestic judgment not of
record, or a recovery of money from a tortfeasor who has been
enriched by the commission of the tort, or a recovery of money
under the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
One of the incidental observations made in reading the cases
was that a court, in giving quasi contractual relief, rarely describes
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the relief as being quasi contractual. In a small number of cases
it uses language which is part of the vocabulary of the law of
quasi contract, but in a great majority of the cases, the court
says nothing about the nature of the relief it is giving.
The writer has attempted to demonstrate this tendency of the
courts in two ways. The first is by quoting the court's language
where it says anything about the nature of the recovery. This
quotation appears in parentheses following the citation of the
case in the footnote, and the absence of such a quotation indicates
that the court was silent in this respect. The second is by tabu-
lating all the cases cited where quasi contractual recovery was
given to a seller or a buyer. This tabulation appears after the
list of the situations, with an expression of the writer's views as
to the importance of what it demonstrates.
THE SITUATIONS
For the sake of convenience, each situation is given a number
prefixed by the letter B or the letter S. The letter B indicates
that a buyer is the plaintiff and the letter S indicates that a seller
is the plaintiff. The writer's views, as to the existence of a
"pattern" in the cases, appear later.
I. THE BUYER AS PLAINTIFF
Situation B 1. No contract exists. Sometimes the acts of the
seller and buyer do not result in a sale or a contract to sell. The
parties may have had an intent to do business, but a manifestation
of mutual assent or consideration may be lacking, or there may be
some other circumstance present which prevent a sale or a contract
to sell from existing. If the buyer in such a case has paid all or
a part of the price and has received no goods, he may recover
what he has paid. 7 His recovery is quasi contractual."
7Hass v. Alpert, (1931) 111 Cal. App. 26, 295 Pac 66 ("The contract
was void for uncertainty, because it could not have been ascertained there-
from what merchandise the respondent agreed to purchase or what price
he undertook to pay.... The contract being void and the consideration for
the $2,500 having wholly failed, respondent was entitled to reimbursement
on his cross-complaint for money had and received.")
Aeronautical Corp. of America v. Franklin Motor Car Co., (1934)
49 Ga. App. 617, 176 S. E. 677 (" . . . there arose no contract between
the parties for the sale of the undelivered aeroplanes ... the money so
deposited was held by the defendant without consideration, and the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover it.")
C. C. King Co. v. Aldrich, (1923) 81 N. H. 42, 121 Atl. 434 (" .
there was a mutual mistake as to the subject matter ...money paid by
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Situation B 2. Goods destroyed after contract is made. Where
there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, and the buyer
pays all or a part of the price, and, while the risk of loss is still
in the seller, the goods wholly perish, the contract is avoided,9
and the buyer may recover what he has paid.' 0 If the goods do
not wholly perish, but perish or deteriorate to a substantial degree,
then the buyer has an election to avoid the contract and recover
what he has paid." The recovery in each case mentioned is quasi
contractual. 12
Situation B 3. Seller's performance becomes impossible. Cases
where a promisor's performance has become impossible may be
classified in different ways.1" One such classification is as follows:
(a) The impossibility is of such a nature that the promisor is
not discharged from liability under his promise, even
though performance thereof has become impossible.
(b) The impossibility is of such a nature that the promisor is
discharged from liability under his promise.
Impossibility of the first class is apparently legally inoperative,
but impossibility of the second class has legal effect, and one of
such effects may be to give one of the parties a right to quasi
contractual recovery.
Where a contract is made for the sale of goods and the buyer
pays all or a part of the price, and thereafter it becomes impossible
for the seller to perform (the impossibility being of the second
class), the buyer may recover what he has paid.' 4  The buyer's
recovery is quasi contractual.'
mistake may be recovered.")
Factor v. Peabody Tailoring System, (1922) 177 Wis. 238, 187 N. W.
984 (" . . . the minds of the parties did not meet as to the particular sub-ject of the contract .... We hold the purported contract to be void, and thejudgment of the circuit court is affirmed.")
sWoodward, Quasi Contracts, ch. IV; Restatement, Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft, 1935, sec. 11.9Uniform Sales Act sec. 8(1) ; 1 Williston, Sales, sec. 164.
101 Williston, Sales, sec. 164; 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1974; Re-
statement, Contracts sec. 468 (2) ; Bowers v. Dr. P. Phillips Co., (1930)
100 Fla. 695, 129 So. 850.
"Uniform Sales Act see. 8 (2) ; 1 Williston, Sales sec. 164; 3 Williston,
Contracts, sec. 1974; Restatement, 2 Contracts sec. 468 (2); Kentucky
Motor Car Co. v. Darenkamp, (1915) 162 Ky. 219, 172 S. W. 524.
"-Woodward, Quasi Contracts, secs. 127, 128.
13For a discussion of the rules of the law of contracts on the subject
of impossibility of performance as a defense to a promisor, see 3 Williston,
Contracts, ch. LIII; Restatement, 1 Contracts, ch. 14.
143 Williston, Contracts, secs. 1972, 1974; Restatement, 2 Contracts,
sec. 468 (2) ; Panto v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., (1926) 215
App. Div. 511, 214 N. Y. S. 19; William F. Mosser Co. v. Cherry River
Boom & Lumber Co.,- (1927) 290 Pa. St. 67, 139 Atl. 85; Heidner v. St.
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Situation B 4. Buyer's performance becomes impossible. The
buyer's performance is ordinarily the payment of money. If a
buyer cannot perform his promise to pay the price, which would
usually be due to a mere lack of money, the standard rule is that
the impossibility is of the first class mentioned in Situation B 3,
and the buyer is not discharged. The seller can recover a judgment
for the price, or for breach of contract, depending on the circum-
stances."0 It follows naturally that if the buyer has paid a part
of the price he cannot recover it.17
Situation B 5. Breach of warranty. Where the seller breaches
an express or implied warranty of title or quality, the buyer has
the privilege of rescinding the contract to sell or the sale and of
recovering what he has paid.'5 The recovery of what has been
Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., (1923) 124 Wash. 652, 215 Pac. 1, cert.
denied (1923) 263 U. S. 721, 44 Sup. Ct. 230, 68 L. E. 524; Cantiare San
Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd., [1924] A. C. 226
(The Earl of Birkenhead said in part: "The remedy now sought is not an
action on the contract, but is independent of it.")
But see Parker v. Hoppe, (1931) 257 N. Y. 333, 178 N. E. 550, re-
argument denied, (1932) 258 N. Y. 365, 179 N. E. 770.
25Woodward, Quasi Contracts sec. 127; Restatement, Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment, Proposed Final Draft, sec. 108 (c).
"'2 Williston, Sales 1656; 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1932; Restate-
ment, 2 Contracts, sec. 455.
'
7But see Clifton v. Coffey, (Aus. 1924) 34 C. L. R. 434 wheire the
contract obligated the buyer absolutely to pay the price, but also apparently
contemplated that the buyer would be unable to raise the money to com-
plete the purchase unless a certain third party loaned him a part of it. On
the refusal of the third party to make the loan, the buyer sued to recover
what he had paid on account of the price and was successful. The Court
said, "We therefore read the words 'which is to be advanced by Resch's
Ltd.' as the statement of an essential circumstance on the faith of which
as a fundamental term and condition the purchaser entered into the bar-
gain. This fundamental term and condition having failed, not only does the
transaction end, but justice requires the return of what the vendor has
in the meantime received." The buyer's recovery was quasi contracfual.
'Uniform Sales Act sec. 69 (Id) (4) ; 2 Williston, Sales, secs. 608,
608a; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 488. The cases found which allow
recovery of the price paid are the following:
Express warranty of title: 'Marin v. Reyes, (1931) 147 Mfisc. Rep. 136,
262 N. Y. S. 577, 579, aff'd (1933) 263 N. Y. 550, 189 N. E. 692 ("...
the defendant [buyer] is entitled to rescission of the contract of sale and to
return of the . . ." part payment of price).
Implied warranty of title: E. 0. Barnett Bros. v. Brown, (1919) 140
Ark. 636, 216 S. W. 1038; McDonnell Motor Hauling Co. v. Morgan Con-
struction Co., (1921) 151 Ark. 262, 235 S. W. 998 (". . . warranty of
title was implied, and appellant, the vendee, had a right to treat the con-
tract at an end by refusing to make further payments and to recover
damages resulting from appellee's breach."); Vehrle v. D. E. McDaneld,
Inc., (1929) 96 Cal. App. 356, 274 Pac. 421 (Buyer " . . . became entitled
to a return of the money paid by him.") ; Espe v. G. "McClelland & Son,
(1929) 208 Iowa 512, 226 N. W. 130 (Court quotes in part as follows
v . . where the defendant has received money of the plaintiff upon a
consideration which has failed, or where the defendant has money of the
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paid is quasi contractual. 9
plaintiff which, in equity and good conscience, he ought to refund, ... the
plaintiff in general is entitled to receive the money back .... ") ; Bos v.
Holleman De Weerd Auto Co., (1929) 246 Mich. 578, 225 N. W. 1
("Plaintiff [buyer] was entitled to a judgment for the amount of money
he had paid, . . . it having been paid without consideration."); Boyer v.
Garner, (Mo. App. 1929) 15 S. W. (2d) 893 (". . . the purchaser should
be permitted to repudiate the contract and recover his money paid .... ) ;
Stein v. Scarpa, (1921) 96 N. J. L. 86, 114 Atl. 245 (" . . . the con-
sideration for the contract had failed .... ") ; Kwiatkowski v. Hoislbauer,
(1920) 13 Ohio App. 202; Hunt v. Dillon, (1927) 123 Okla. 252, 253 Pac.
90 (the court quotes in part as follows: " . . . when a buyer is entitled to
rescind the contract .. .he may recover back whatever part of the price
he may have paid.") ; Nill v. Vilsack, (1915) 247 Pa. St. 487, 93 At. 622;
Mann v. Rafferty, (1930) 100 Pa. Super. 228 (" . . . such a suit is not
on the contract but in disaffirmance of it by an action for the purchase
money as for total failure of consideration."); Smith v. Russ Mfg. Co.,
(1932) 167 S. C. 464, 166 S. E. 607.
Express warranty of quality: Siegel, King & Co. v. Penny & Baldwin,
(1928) 176 Ark. 336, 2 S. W. (2d) 1082; Lewis Supply Co. v. Galloway,
(1932) 185 Ark. 1164, 51 S. W. (2d) 983 ("If there was . . . a breach of
the warranty . . .appellee [buyer] had the right to rescind the sale and to
demand a return of so much of the purchase money as had been paid.") ;
Conlin v. Studebaker Brothers Co., (1917) 175 Cal. 395, 165 Pac. 1009;
Mahony v. Standard Gas Engine Co., (1921) 187 Cal. 399, 202 Pac. 146
("In short, the action is for money had and received, which this court
has held may be maintained whenever an equity or legal right arises from
the circumstances that one person has rfioney which he ought to pay to an-
other"); Coats v. Hord, (1915) 29 Cal. App. 115, 154 Pac. 491; United
Motor San Francisco Co. v. Callander, (1916) 30 Cal. App. 41, 157 Pac.
561; Knight v. Bentel, (1919) 39 Cal. App. 502, 179 Pac. 406; Ray v. Ameri-
can Photo Player Co., (1920) 46 Cal. App. 311, 189 Pac. 130; Lane v. McLay,
(1916) 91 Conn. 185, 99 Atl. 498; Bankendorf v. Sevelovitz, (1922) 28 Ga.
App. 327, 111 S. E. 77; W. Heller and Sons v. Illinois Traction Co., (1914)
186 Ill. App. 327; Ballard v. Byerly, (1924) 233 Ill. App. 522; Burke v.
The Instant Heat Co., (1925) 236 Ill. App. 275 (". . . the plaintiff [buyer]
was entitled to sue for the return of his money."); Conroy v. Coughlin
Auto Co., (1917) 181 Iowa 916, 165 N. W. 200; Hoyer v. Good, (1917) 182
Iowa 148, 161 N. W. 691 (". . . the plaintiffs [buyers] have declared upon
a recission and have stood upon it on the ground of breach of warranty.
...") ; Lahiff v. Keville, (1918) 184 Iowa 1334, 169 N. W. 751; Granette
Products Co. v. Arthur H. Neumann & Co., (1925) 200 Iowa 572, 205 N. W.
205 ("But where the contract contemplates the furnishing of material for
a particular purpose, as the erection of a structure, and the purchaser expends
money in attempting to so use it, and later rescinds the contract because of
the failure of the material to comply with the contract, he is entitled to
be put in statu quo; and this includes the recovery of not only the money
he has paid under the contract, but also the reasonable expense he was put to
in attempting to use the material for the contemplated purpose.") ; Vander-
mark v. Kansas Moline Plow Co., (1923) 114 Kan. 6, 216 Pac. 829; Clark
v. Linley Motor Co., (1928) 126 Kan. 419, 268 Pac. 860; Huber Mfg. Co.
v. Piersall, (1912) 150 Ky. 307, 150 S. W. 341; Debaun v. Weaver, (1921)
190 Ky. 685, 228 S. W. 27 ("The plaintiff [buyer] ...was entitled to re-
cover the purchase price.") ; J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Walters
Brothers, (1922) 197 Ky. 348, 246 S. W. 831 ("They [the buyers] were
clearly entitled to a rescission of the contract and a return of their money.
..."); Borden Aicklen Auto Supply Co., v. Mid City, Inc., (1926) 4 La.
App. 489; Hutchinson Bros. v. Byrd & Jolliff, (1927) 6 La. App. 367:
Munson v. Simon, (1927) 6 La. App. 550; Stewart v. Clay, (1929) 10
La. App. 727, 123 So. 158 (The seller having breached a warranty ".... can-
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The English law is a little different in that facts which would,
under the Uniform Sales Act, create a warranty, may, under the
not recover the balance of the price and in fact, must return what has been
paid to him."); Greer v. Whalen, (1915) 125 Md. 273, 93 Atl. 521 ("...
he [the buyer] may return the chattels . . . and recover back in assumpsit
on the common counts the money paid. . . .") ; Cromwell v. Chance Marine
Construction Co., (1917) 131 Md. 105, 101 Ati. 623 ("It [the action of as-
sumpsit for money had and received] lies to recover money in the posses-
sion of the defendant which in justice and good conscience belongs to the
plaintiff. .. .") ; W. H. Edgar & Son v. Imperial Ice Cream Co., (1923) 142
Md. 310, 120 Atl. 832; Gottman v. Jeffrey-Nichols Co., (1929) 268 Mass.
10, 167 N. E. 229; Gordon v. American Tankers Corp., (1934) 286 Mass.
349, 191 N. E. 51; Taylor v. Belton, (1915) 188 Mich. 302, 154 N. W. 149
(The plaintiff sued "on the common counts in assumpsit" and recovered in
trial court. "We are of opinion that in this the learned trial judge was not
in error.") ; Wozniak v. Ford, (1921) 216 Mich. 613, 185 N. W. 670;
Kawecki v. Stuber-Stone Co., (1922) 218 Mich. 25, 187 N. W. 272 ("The
plaintiff, by rescission, treats the contract as terminated and sues to recover
what he has paid defendant and for which he has received no consideration.") ;
Krzyszke v. Ohio & Michigan Coal Co., (1928) 241 Mich. 487, 217 N. W.
403; W. W. Kimball Co. v. Massey, (1914) 126 Minn. 461, 148 N. W.
307; Cafferty v. Klatt, (1920) 147 Minn. 245, 179 N. W. 1002; Clifford v.
Stewart, (1922) 153 Minn. 382, 190 N. W. 613 (Court relies on Uniform
Sales Act, sec. 69) ; Fiterman v. J. N. Johnson & Co., (1923) 156 Minn. 201,
194 N. W. 399 (Court relies on Uniform Sales Act, sec. 69); Tiffany v.
Times Square Automobile Co., (1913) 168 Mo. App. 729, 154 S. W. 865;
Shannon v. Abell, (1913) 169 Mo. App. 598, 155 S. W. 62; Smith v.
Means, (1913) 170 Mo. App. 158, 155 S. W. 454 ("The petition in this case
states facts which would entitle the plaintiff [buyer] to ... a rescission of the
contract and a return of the purchase price .. ") ; City Light, Power, Ice
& Storage Co. v. St. Mary's Machine Co., (1913) 170 Mo. App. 224, 156
S. W. 83; Peterson v. Barbero, (1914) 180 Mo. App. 365, 167 S. W. 1180;
Sutherland v. Green, (1914) 49 Mont. 379, 142 Pac. 636; Murray v. Bailey,
(1923) 110 Neb. 114, 193 N. W. 259; National Sand & Gravel Co. v. R. H.
Beaumont Co., (1931) 9 N. J. Misc. 1026, 156 Atl. 441 (Court relies on Uni-
form Sales Act, sec. 69 (id)); Sterling Motor Truck Co. v. Schuchman,
(1932) 260 N. Y. 358, 183 N. E. 524, 260 N. Y. 698, 184 N. E. 151; Dochter-
mann Van & Express Co. v. Fiss, Doerr & Carroll Horse Co., (1913) 155
App. Div. 162, 140 N. Y. S. 72; Shimel v. Williams Oven Mfg. Co., (1916)
93 Misc. Rep. 174, 156 N. Y. S. 1060 ("... . an action may be brought on
the theory of a rescission of the contract and for a recovery of the amount
paid.... "); Levy v. Chonavitz, (Sullivan County Court, 1917) 163 N. Y. S.
658 (... the plaintiff [buyer] was within his rights when he demanded the
return of his money...."); Glanzer v. J. K. Armsby Co., (App. Term 1918)
170 N. Y. S. 1055 (" . . . plaintiffs [buyers] would be entitled to recover
back the purchase price paid") ; Feinman v. Weil, (1918) 105 Misc. Rep. 298,
173 N. Y. S. 11; Musso v. Ginzburg, (App. Term 1918) 173 N. Y. S. 141;
Beeman Shoe Co. v. Carey, (App. Term 1919) 176 N. Y. S. 435 ("...
plaintiff [buyer] was entitled to the judgment . . ." for the price paid.);
Seligman v. Duff, (1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 533, 179 N. Y. S. 419 ("Upon
the rescission of the contract by the plaintiff's assignors they were en-
titled to the return of the consideration that they had paid upon the
contract.") ; Joannes Bros. Co. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., (1923) 129
Misc. Rep. 474, 201 N. Y. S. 409, aff'd (1924) 205 N. Y. S. 930
(". . . the plaintiff has rescinded the contract of sale and can recover
the price paid thereon. . . .") ; Harrolds Motorcar Co. v. Gordon, (1927)
129 Misc. Rep. 348, 221 N. Y. S. 486; Jones v. Healy, (1932) 237
App. Div. 264, 261 N. Y. S. 464 ("The plaintiff . . . rescinded the contract
and offered to return the horse to the seller, who refused to accept the horse
and became immediately liable for the price theretofore paid," citing Uni-
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Sale of Goods Act, create either a warranty or a condition.20 Under
the Sale of Goods Act the effect of a breach of warranty is merely
to give the buyer a right of action for damages for breach of war-
ranty.2 The buyer remains liable for the price, and naturally
cannot recover any part of the price he may have paid. Under the
same Act, the effect of a breach of a condition, is to give the buyer
form Sales Act, sec. 69 (1d) ; Marin v. Francisca Reyes, Inc., (1931) 147
Misc. Rep. 136, 262 N. Y. S. 577, aff'd (1933) 263 N. Y. 550, 189
N. E. 692 (". . . the defendant [buyer] is entitled to recission of the con-
tract of sale and to return of the . . ." part payment of price.) ; Holden v.
Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., Inc., (1931) 61 N. D. 584, 239 N. W.
479; Couch v. O'Brien, (1913) 41 Okla. 76, 136 Pac. 1088; Kaiser v. Geis,
(1915) 52 Okla. 604, 153 Pac. 148; Netter v. Edmunson, (1914) 71 Or.
604, 143 Pac. 636; Terrell v. Landrum, (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 153 S. W.
647; Underwood v. Jordan, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 166 S. W. 88; Halff
Co. v. Jones, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 169 S. W. 906; Avery Co. v. Staples
Merc. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 183 S. W. 43 ("This is ... an action to
recover money paid for a worthless machine .. ") ; Fuller v. Cameron,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 209 S. W. 711 ("When the right to rescind was
established, it was the further duty of the court to award appellant [buyer]
judgment for all money paid on the contract .... and all special or conse-
quential damages or expense incurred in respect to the contract as a result
of the misrepresentation."); Stevens v. Blood, (1916) 90 Vt. 81, 96 At.
697; Hayes & Porter, Inc. v. Wood, (1915) 86 Wash. 254, 150 Pac. 1.
Implied warranty of quality: Harriman v. Richardson, (1921) 51 App.
D. C. 24, 273 Fed. 752 (". . . this is not an action upon a sealed instrument
for a breach thereof, but is an action [on the common counts] for money
had and received, upon the theory that the contract has been rescinded.") ;
Ideal Coated Paper Co. v. Samuel Cupples Envelope Co., (1912) 169 Ill.
App. 484 (Set off by buyer. ". . . the paper delivered . . . did not comply
with the conditions of the sale, and defendant was entitled to recover from
plaintiff the money paid therefor.") ; Burke v. Instant Heat Co., (1925)
236 Ill. App. 275 (". . . the plaintiff [buyer] was entitled to sue for the
return of his money.") ; United Engine Co. v. Junis, (1923) 196 Iowa 914,
195 N. W. 606 ("It is a universal rule that, where a party has paid a
portion of the purchase price, and seeks a rescission of the contract, he
can, in an action for rescission, recover the portion of the purchase price
that has so been paid."); Clark v. Linley Motor Co., (1928) 126 Kan.
419, 268 Pac. 860; Dunbar-Dukate Co., v. Martin Fountain & Co., (1930)
171 La. 391, 131 So. 185 (Breach of implied warranty of quality. "Hence
plaintiff was entitled, on returning the goods, to the restitution of the pur-
chase price and the reimbursement of the amount paid for freight charges.") ;
Woodward Wight & Co. v. Cotonio, (La. App. 1934) 152 So. 336 ("De-
fendant [buyer] was therefore entitled to . . . the return of his money.") ;
Cannon v. Page & Baker Co., (1933) 281 Mass. 533, 183 N. E. 892; Reed v.
David Stott Flour Mills, (1921) 216 Mich. 616, 185 N. W. 715; G. B.
Shearer Co. v. Kakoulis, (Otsego County Court 1913) 144 N. Y. S. 1077;
Wilson & Co. v. M. Werk Co., (1922) 104 Ohio St. 507, 136 N. E. 202;
Klinge v. Farris, (1929) 128 Or. 142, 268 Pac. 748, 273 Pac. 954; Long v.
Five-Hundred Co., (1923) 123 Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559.
19Restatement, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Tent. Draft, 1935,
sees. 13 and 23.
20Sale of Goods Act sec. 11 (1b, 1c) applicable to England and Ire-
land; secs. 12, 13, 14, 15.
21Sale of Goods Act sec. 62 (1) defines "warranty" as having this
effect in England and Ireland.
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'a right to treat the contract as repudiated. '22  If the buyer does
"treat the contract as repudiated," he may recover any part of
the price he may have paid,22 and such recovery would be quasi
contractual.
2 4
More than one-fifth of the cases found from 1912 to 1935,
where a buyer or a seller is given quasi contractual recovery, are
breach of warranty cases. This might at first seem surprising in
view of the fact that the majority of states recognize the remedy
of rescission and recovery of the price, either as a matter of
common law or under the Uniform Sales Act. It might seem
that so much appellate court litigation in breach of warranty cases
would be unnecessary. The reason for this large amount of
litigation, however, is that the facts and not the law have been
disputed. The seller has not been resisting the buyer's claim for
repayment of the price on the ground that the buyer is wrong on
the law. The seller takes the position either (a) that he made
no express warranty, or (b) that circumstances giving rise to
an implied warranty did not exist, or (c) that if there were a
warranty he did not breach it, or (d) that, if there were a breach
of warranty, the buyer, by his conduct, never acquired or has
lost the privilege to rescind.
Situation B 6. Seller delivers less than agreed quantity.
Where the parties contract for the sale of a quantity of goods
at a certain price per unit, and where the buyer pays the entire
price to which the seller apparently will be entitled, and the seller
fails to deliver all of the goods, the buyer may recover the part of
the price equivalent to the part of the goods not delivered. 25 This
--Sale of Goods Act sec. 11 (lb) applicable to England and Ireland.
23Implied condition of right to sell: Rowland v. Divall, [1923] 2 K. B.
500 ("It seems to me that in this case there has been a total failure of con-
sideration, that is to say that the buyer has not got any part of that for
which he paid the purchase money.").
Express statements regarding goods which were designated by the
Court as conditions: Fisher, Reeves & Co., Ltd. v. Armour & Co., Ltd.,
[1920] 3 K. B. 614; Fleming v. Wilkie, (Sask. 1919) 12 S. L R. 393,
49 D. L. R. 27 (Newlands, J. A., said in part that the buyer is "entitled"
to recover the part payment of price.)
Implied condition of fitness for purpose: Baldry v. Marshall, [1925]
1 K. B. 260.
For the way the Scottish law deals with these cases see: Edgar v.
Hector, [1912] Sess. Cas. 348; Kyle v. Sim, [1925] Sess. Cas. 425.24The seller has made no contractual promise to repay the price, and,
if he were allowed to retain it, he would be unjustly enriched.
252 Williston, Sales sec. 600; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 349, illus-
tration 5; Greenfield Box Co. v. Independence Veneer & Box Mfg. Co.,
(1927) 163 La. 86, 111 So. 608 ("This action does not arise out of a con-
tract, but out of a quasi-contract. . . .") ; Diamond City Beef P. & P. Co.-
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situation concerns only the case where the amount paid by the
buyer is the exact amount to which the seller will be entitled if
he performs the contract. The amount of the buyer's recovery is
ordinarily the contract price of the goods not delivered. The
buyer's recovery is quasi contractual.
2 3
Situation B 7. Goods do not conform to contract. Where
goods are sold or contracted to be sold by description (meaning
that the goods are to be identified by the description) there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
2 7
Where specific goods are described by the seller as having certain
attributes, the accuracy of the seller's description is warranted..
20
In either case, if the goods tendered or delivered to the buyer do
not conform to the description, the seller is guilty of a breach of
warranty. The consequences of the breach of warranty are that
the buyer may reject or return the goods and recover any part
of the price he may have paid and his recovery will be quasi
contractual.
2 9
The cases discussed in the present situation are all cases which
could have been handled by the court as warranty cases, as set
forth in the preceding paragraph. 0 Actually the court said, in
v. Murdoch-James Co., (1921) 270 Pa. St. 455, 113 Atl. 556 (".... plaintiff
was entitled to recover at least the amount which it had overpaid....") ;
Behrend & Co., Ltd. v. Produce Brokers Co., Ltd., [1920] 3 K. B. 530
(The buyer "must pay for the goods kept at the contract price, and he can
recover the price paid for the undelivered portion").
26Woodward, Quasi Contracts, sec. 179; Restatement, Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft, 1935, secs. 13, 15, 16.
27Uniform Sales Act sec. 14; 1 Williston, Sales secs. 223 to 225.
28Uniform Sales Act sec. 12; 1 Williston, Sales sec. 205.
29Situation B 5.
3OAssociated Fruit Company v. Marone, (1924) 68 Cal. App. 358, 229
Pac. 868; Stella v. Smith, (1930) 109 Cal. App. 409, 293 Pac. 656; Snell-
grove v. Dingelhoef, (1920) 25 Ga. App. 334, 103 S. E. 418; Moyer v.
Hyde, (1922) 35 Idaho 161, 204 Pac. 1068; Lake v. Western Silo Co.,
(1916) 177 Iowa 735, 158 N. W. 673 (". . . we think the trial court properly
instructed that plaintiff might recover, not only the money paid, but the
expense he was put to in attempting to erect the structure") ; Cardwell v.
Bennett, (1919) 105 Kan. 114, 181 Pac. 602; Bradley Bros. v. Jones &
Rogers, (1913) 153 Ky. 174, 154 S. W. 1091; Reynolds v. Cooper, (1922)
193 Ky. 763, 237 S. W. 667; Greenfield Box Co. v. Independence Veneer &
Box Mfg. Co., Ltd., (1927) 163 La. 86, 111 So. 608 ("This action does not
arise out of a contract, but out of a quasi-contract . . .") ; Ray Motor Co.
v. Stanyan, (1923) 123 Me. 346, 122 Atl. 874; Orr Felt & Blanket Co. v.
Sherwin Wool Co., (1923) 248 Mass. 553, 143 N. E. 541; Gordon v.
American Tankers Corp., (1934) 286 Mass. 349, 191 N. E. 51; Davis v.
Aronow, (1921) 191 N. Y. S. 309; Smith v. Hellman Motor Corp., (1924)
122 Misc. Rep. 422, 204 N. Y. S. 229 ("If a person pays over money to
another under a mistake of fact, the person receiving the money would be
in possession of something to which he is not entitled, and thus he would
become unjustly enriched."); S. Liebovitz & Son v. Rosenberg-Neugass
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substance, that the seller had agreed to deliver a certain kind of
goods and that he had failed to deliver proper goods.
The court further said, in substance, that the buyer need not
accept or keep the goods and that the buyer could recover the price
he had paid. Apparently the reason why the buyer could re-
cover the price was not that the seller had breached a warranty
but that the seller had failed to deliver or tender goods conform-
ing to the contract.
The buyer, in recovering the price paid, was being given quasi
contractual recovery.31
Situation B 8. Seller commits material breach other than as to
quality or quantity. The fact that a buyer is given quasi con-
tractual recovery where the seller's performance is defective as
to the quality or the quantity of the goods tendered or delivered,
has already been seen.32  It likewise is true that if the seller
commits a material breach of the contract in some other way, not
relating to quality or quantity, the buyer may refuse to go on with
the contract and may recover any part of the price he may have
paid. 3
3
Co., (1925) 213 App. Div. 143, 210 N. Y. S. 145 ("Our conclusion is that,
under the form of action brought here for money had and received, although
the plaintiff was required to pay for the goods before inspection, if upon
inspection the goods were discovered not to conform to the contract, it is
entitled to recover the payment which it made.") ; Bower-Venus Grain Co.
v. Norman Milling & Grain Co., (1922) 86 Okla. 152, 207 Pac. 297; Flatow,
Riley & Co. v. Roy Campbell Co., (Tex Comm. App. 1926) 280 S. W. 517
(" .. . the original petition was, in effect, a suit, not for damages based
upon the failure of the defendant in error to comply with a contract, but was
a suit upon the implied promise of the defendant in error to repay to the
plaintiffs in error the amount of the. . ." price paid by plaintiffs in error.) ;
Buck v. Racine Boat Co., (1923) 180 Wis. 245, 192 N. W. 998 (" . . . the
plaintiff was within his legal rights in refusing to accept the boat, and he
is entitled to recover the purchase price.").3 Restatement, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft 1935
secs. 13 and 23.32 Situations B5, B6, B7.
112 Williston, Sales sec. 600; 3 Williston, Contracts, secs. 1454, 1457;
Restatement, Contracts sec. 347.
Connell Bros. Co. v. Diederichsen & Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1914) 213
Fed. 737; Campbell Motor Co. v. Brewer, (1924) 212 Ala. 50, 101 So.
748; Sharp v. Osborne, (1931) 38 Ariz. 452, 300 Pac. 1004; Mettler v.
Vance, (1916) 30 Cal. App. 499, 158 Pac. 1044; Gally v. Wynne, (1929) 96
Cal. App. 145, 273 Pac. 825 ("Where, as here, one party to a contract
admittedly breaches it, the other party is entitled to treat the vendor's
breach as an abandonment and himself abandon the contract and sue at law
to recover what he has paid in an action for money had and received.");
Spencer v. Brundage, (1921) 69 Colo. 520, 194 Pac. 1104 (". . . such actions
can always be maintained wherever one has received money which, in
equity and good conscience, he ought to pay over."); Manning v. Chesky,
(1916) 90 Conn. 647, 98 At. 357 (" . . . whenever one person has in his
possession money which in equity and good conscience he should not re-
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The most common breaches among the cases cited were that
the seller was late in tendering the goods or never tendered them
or repudiated the contract or broke his promise to do some act in
connection with the deal or asserted some privilege which he did
not have.
tain from another, the latter may recover it in this form of action.")
Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. Inc. v. Gaynor Manufactur-
ing Co., (1923) 98 Conn. 721, 120 Atl. 572 (". . . the money cannot in
equity and good conscience be retained . . ."); Haverty Furniture Co. v.
Calhoun, (1914) 15 Ga. App. 620, 84 S. E. 138; Adams v. Gemes, (1921)
27 Ga. App. 66, 107 S. E. 373; Adams Tailoring Co. v. Thomas, (1924)
31 Ga. App. 787, 122 S. E. 246; Maxant v. Chicago Screw Co., (1912) 171
Ill. App. 481 (The buyers had "the right to cancel the contract and recover
the money advanced by them to defendant thereon."); Vanselow v. Bender,
(1912) 175 Ill. App. 460 ("Where the vendor has received part of the pur-
chase money and is in default by reason of his failure to deliver the property
sold ... the law implies a promise on his part to repay the purchase money
paid, and an action for money had and received lies against him for all
money paid to, and retained, by him. . . . "); Craven v. Stone Store &
Office Fixture Co., (1915) 191 Ill. App. 566; Kabrick v. J. I. Case Thresh-
ing Machine Co., (1917) 180 Iowa 598, 163 N. W. 368; Stamper v.
Foreman-Earle Co., (1914) 158 Ky. 324, 164 S. W. 937; Morgan & Lindsey
v. Ellis Variety Stores, (1929) 168 La. 1073, 123 So. 717, 176 La. 198, 145
So. 514; Thomas v. Philip Werlein, Ltd., (1935) 181 La. 104, 158 So. 635
(Seller ". . . must return such partial payments as it has received. .. ") ;
Brown v. Sallinger, (1913) 214 Mass. 245, 101 N. E. 382 ("To permit him
[seller] to be enriched by that for which he has given no equivalent . . .
would be to confer a legal right which the law does not recognize.");
Martin v. James Cunningham Son & Co., (1918) 231 Mass. 280, 121 N. E.
21 ("And the consideration having entirely failed, they are entitled to re-
cover back the money paid on account of the contract price.") ; Fisher v.
Super Motor Sales Co., (1929) 247 Mich. 485, 226 N. W. 222 ("Plaintiff
then had the right to treat the contract as at an end and recover the down
payment under the common count."); Osterweil v. Consolidated Machinery
& Wrecking Co., (1917) 165 N. Y. S. 366; Cohen v. Shecket, (1918) 170
N. Y. S. 372; Greenberg, v. Hurlburt Motor Truck Co., (1918) 170 N. Y. S.
441 ("Upon defendant's failure to fulfill its agreement the plaintiff was
undoubtedly entitled to the return of the amount of his deposit."); Apex
Chemical Co. v. Compson, (1918) 171 N. Y. S. 60 ("After such rescission it
[buyer] was entitled, under section 150, subd. (d), to nothing more than
the return of the purchasing price.") ; O'Kane v. North American Distilling
Co., (1918) 171 N. Y. S. 275 (The seller was "bound to return to the plain-
tiff [buyer] the consideration paid by him.") ; Massey v. Becker, (1919)
90 Or. 461, 176 Pac. 425; Morley Auto Co. v. Pittsburg Machine Tool Co.,
(1913) 54 Pa. Super Ct. 223; Sterling Mint Co. v. Dellenbarger Machine
Co., (1932) 107 Pa. Super Ct. 287; Seltzer v. Pugh, (R. I. 1927) 136 At.
765; Jahn & Co. v. L. A. Wright, (1919) 109 Wash. 164, 186 Pac. 262;
Taylor v. Foster, (1921) 115 Wash. 249, 197 Pac. 21 (Seller's failure to
deliver was ". . . a breach of the contract on his part, justifying respondent
in going no further, and entitling him to a return of the money paid.");
Barham v. Vickers, (1922) 122 Wash. 439, 210 Pac. 803 ("Having received
$3,000 . . . for which he [seller] has never delivered, or tendered delivery
of, any consideration, his liability for that amount follows as a logical
and legal sequence."); Globe Manufacturing Co. v. Durland, (1929) 151
Wash. 243, 275 Pac. 705 (Buyers ". . . were entitled to a return of the
money paid when the contract was executed") ; Prah v. Ebner, (1929) 200
Wis, 40, 227 N. W. 256.
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The recovery by the buyer, of the price paid by him, is regarded
by the writer as quasi contractual. 34
Situation B 9. Seller induces contract by fraud. If a seller
by fraud induces a buyer to enter into a sale or a contract to
sell, the transaction will be voidable by the buyer.3 The nature of
the seller's fraud may also be such as to prevent any sale or
contract to sell from ever coming into existence.3 6 In either case,
the buyer may recover any part of the price he may have paid,3
34The buyer's recovery apparently is regarded as quasi contractual by
Professor Williston, 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1454.
The Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 347 in stating the right of a party
to get "restitution" in such a case as the present one, seems to regard the
plaintiff's recovery as quasi contractual, but the Restatement does not use
the word "quasi contract," nor a derivative thereof.
The recovery is regarded as quasi contractual in Notes and Comment,
(1922) 7 Corn. L. Q. 166.
Professor Woodward takes the following position (Woodward, Quasi
Contracts, sec. 260): "This right to restitution would seem to be in reality
nothing more than an alternative remedial right arising from the violation
of a contract. Accurately speaking, therefore, it is not a quasi contractual
right. The only primary obligation is the obligation to perform the con-
tract; the only primary right the right to such performance. As in the
case of the action for restitution as an alternative remedy for certain torts(post, sec. 270 et seq.), however, it has been commonly regarded as quasi
contractual, and for that reason may be considered in this treatise."
352 Williston, Sales, ch. xxv; Restatement, 2 Contracts sec. 476.
312 Williston, Sales, sec. 625; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 475, Illus-
tration 4.
372 Williston, Sales, sec. 647; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 488; Re-
statement, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft, 1935 sec. 23.
In the following cases, the fraud consisted of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions by the seller concerning the goods or concerning his title to them.
In re Syracuse Gardens Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1916) 231 Fed. 284 ("The re-
covery of the money paid in all these cases rests on the proposition that
it does not belong to the seller, who had no title to the goods purported to
be sold, but to the buyer, who was parted with his money without considera-
tion."); Mooney v. Cyriacks, (1921) 185 Cal. 70, 195 Pac. 922 (Buyer
rescinded purchase of automobile for seller's fraud and recoverd part pay-
ment of price plus money expended for license fee and automobile insur-
ance.); Knight v. Bentel, (1919) 39 Cal. App. 502, 179 Pac. 406; Macow-
sky v. Irvine, (1925) 71 Cal. App. 77, 234 Pac. 839 ("The contract being
rescinded, the proper action was by declaration of the cause in equity and
suit on the implied promise to repay. . . .") ; International Harvester Co.
v. Edwards, (1925) 76 Colo. 531, 233 Pac. 164 ("It seems to us it would
be a reproach to the law if plaintiff was to be denied relief in this action.") ;
Consolidated Garage & Sales Co. v. Dilts, (1922) 79 Ind App. 287, 137
N. E. 771; Holt v. Richardson, (1924) 116 Kan. 47, 225 Pac. 1086; Bunch
v. Paxton, Duke & Bradley, (Mo. App. 1927) 295 S. W. 474 ("This is a
suit to recover the consideration paid by plaintiff to defendant upon a
secondhand automobile . . .") ; Cockrell v. Capital City Auto Co., Inc.,
(1926) 3 La. App. 385 (". . . the absence of consent invalidates the con-
tract and entitles plaintiff [buyer] to a rescission of the sale and return
of the purchase price.") ; Granlund v. Saraf, (1928) 263 Mass. 76, 160 N. E.
408; Gottman v. Jeffrey-Nichols Co., (1929) 268 Mass. 10, 167 N. E. 229;
Snyder v. Markham, (1912) 172 Mich. 693, 138 N. W. 234; Patterson v.
Kasper, (1914) 182 Mich. 281, 148 N. W. 690 (". . . this is an action of
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and his recovery is quasi contractual.38
Situation B 10. Contract rescinded by mutual assent. If a
contract to sell is rescinded by the mutual assent of the parties
and if the buyer has paid a part of the price, the problem will
arise as to whether the buyer may recover what he has paid. The
Restatements of Contracts" and Professor Williston 0 take the
position that the buyer is entitled to recover the price paid only
if the agreement of rescission includes a promise by the seller to
refund it. The promise to refund, according to these authorities,
need not be express, but may be found by "a fair interpretation of
the words or acts of the parties."' 4 1  If no such actual promise to
refund can be found then they contend that the seller may keep
the payment made.42 The theory seems to be that the parties either
manifest an intention that the seller shall refund the payment or
else manifest a contrary intention that the seller shall retain the
payment.
It is submitted that there is a third possibility, namely, that
the parties manifest no intention at all with reference to the price
paid. This failure on the part of the rescinding parties to mani-
fest any intention as to what the seller is to do with the money
in his hands may be an oversight or it may be due to craftiness on
the part of each of them-each one may be anxious to terminate
at once his future duties under the contract, with the intention of
discussing or litigating the matter of the part payment of price
later. They may be mutually willing to call off the deal-to stop
where they are-to carry the performance no farther. Their
assumpsit wherein plaintiff is seeking to recover his own money. .. .");
Bucannan v. Raymond, (1923) 224 Mich. 462, 194 N. W. 980 (". . . he[the buyer] had the right to rescind and recover back.") ; Clark v. Wells,(1914) 127 Minn. 353, 149 N. W. 547; Rice v. Levinger, (1933) 141 Or.
413, 18 P. (2d) 221; Southern Iron & Equipment Co. v. Bamberg, E. & W.
Ry. Co., (1929) 151 S. C. 506, 149 S. E. 271 ("Upon rescission of the con-
tract by railway company [buyer], it had a right to receive back this
amount (part payment of price).") ; Way v. Siddall, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
299 S. W. 313 (Affirmance of lower court judgment which allowed buyer,
who rescinded for seller's fraud, to recover price paid plus the amount of
money paid out by the buyer in attempting to use the machine.); Stevens
v. Blood, (1916) 90 Vt. 81, 96 Atl. 697; Hayes & Porter, Inc. v. Wood,(1915) 86 Wash. 254, 150 Pac. 1; Frahm v. Moore, (1932) 168 Wash. 212,
11 P. (2d) 593.
In one case the fraud consisted of the corruption by the seller of the
buyer's chauffeur: Alexander v. Webber, [1922] 1 K. B. 642.3
-Restatement, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft 1935
sec. 23.39Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 409.
403 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1827.
413 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1827.42Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 406, Illustration 1.
QUASI CONTRACTS IN SALES CASES
mutual agreement to rescind will terminate their duties to perform
their original promises. The original contract will cease to exist,
but the seller will be holding the money which the buyer has paid.
It is further submitted that the application of quasi contract
principles in such a case will result in a refund to the buyer. The
seller has received a benefit which, if he were allowed to retain it,
would result in his unjust enrichment. The objection may be made
that the retention by the seller is not unjust. The answer to this
objection will be found in examining the agreement of rescission.
If the seller was willing to discharge the contract in exchange
simply for the buyer's agreement to discharge the seller from the
seller's duty to proceed, and without demanding that he, the seller,
be allowed to keep the part payment, what claim can the seller
have to the money in his hands after the rescission is complete?
By hypothesis the agreement for rescission included no more than
as just stated-there was no agreement as to retention or refund.
In the cases cited the buyer recovered the price he had paid
and in each case there appears to be no agreement as to whether
the seller should retain or refund the payment. 43 That the buyer's
recovery in these cases is quasi contractual would seem to be
shown by the quotations from them which appear in the footnote.
It is necessary to point out that this article does not purport
to state that the law is that a buyer may recover a payment on
account of the price in the situation where a rescission agreement
contains no provision, expressly or by implication of fact, concern-
ing the price paid. The contention is made, however, that the
decisions herein cited vbich order the seller to refund the payment
can be explained and justified as being the result of the application
of quasi contract principles to the facts in question.
43Green v. Darling, (1925) 73 Cal. App. 700, 239 Pac. 70 ("If the
minds of the parties met on the proposition that they would rescind, it
was not necessary that the defendant stipulate to return to the plaintiff
the money he had received, for the law requires him to do this as a con-
sequence of.having agreed that the contract be abrogated... !"); Fisher v.
Tauber, (1912) 174 Ill. App. 436 ("If the contract of exchange was re-
scinded, the law implied a promise on the part of the defendant that on the
receipt of the horse he had traded to plaintiff, he would return to plain-
tiff the horse and money he had received from him . . ."); Drosdoff v.
Fetzer, (1913) 178 Ill. App. 336 ("In case of such rescissions the parties
should be put by each other as nearly as possible in the 'statu quo ante, etc.,'
and the law will compel a final adjustment to this end ..... ") ; Stella v.
Lincoln Motor Co., (1917) 166 N. Y. S. 763; H. Muller & Co., v. Effangee
Tobacco Co., (1920) 180 N. Y. S. 344 aff'd (1920) 229 N. Y. 594, 129
N. E. 922 ("A rescission accepted entitles the parties to be put in statu quo in
respect of the contract and entitles the plaintiff to recover all moneys paid
thereon.").
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Situation B 11. Rescinding buyer claims damages or expenses
in addition to the price paid. It has been seen that where a buyer
rescinds a sale or a contract to sell for breach of warranty or
avoids a sale or a contract to sell because of the seller's fraud, he
may recover any part of the price he may have paid and his recov-
ery is quasi contractual.
44
There have been a number of cases decided in late years where
the buyer who rescinds or avoids in such cases has asked for and
been allowed to recover not only the payment of price, but also
expenses and damages incurred. The buyer has been allowed, in
addition to a recovery of the price, to recover freight charges,45
cartage charges,46 unloading charges, 47 installation costs, 48 erection
costs, 49 automobile license fees and automobile insurance pre-
miums,50 money expended in trying to use the goods,"' and for
44Situation B5 and Situation B-9.
45McDonnell Motor Hauling Co. v. Morgan Construction Co., (1921)
151 Ark. 262, 235 S. W. 998 (". . warranty of title was implied, and
appellant, the vendee, had a right to treat the contract at an end by refusing
to make further payments and to recover damages resulting from ap-
pellee's breach."); Dunbar-Dukate Co. v. Martin Fountain & Co., (1930)
171 La. 391 131 So. 185 (Breach of implied warranty of quality. "Hence
plaintiff was entitled, on returning the goods, to the restitution of the pur-
chase price and the reimbursement of the amount paid for freight charges.") ;
Crown Printing Co. v. Charles Beck Co., (1920) 73 Pa. Super Ct. 419
(Bailment lease-"The plaintiffs' action rests on the implied promises of
the defendants to return the money received by them from plaintiffs when,
the consideration therefor failed because of the unfitness of the thing
leased.").
46Seligman v. Duff, (1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 533, 179 N. Y. S. 419
("Upon the rescission of the contract by the plaintiff's assignors they were
entitled to the return of the consideration that they had paid upon the
contract.").4 7McDonnell Motor Hauling Co. v. Morgan Construction Co., (1921)
151 Ark 262, 235 S. W. 998 (". . . warranty of title was implied, and
appellant, the vendee, had a right to treat the contract at an end by re-
fusing to make further payments and to recover damages resulting from
appellee's breach.").4 8United Engine Co. v. Junis, (1923) 196 Iowa 914, 195 N. W. 606
. . upon rescission, appellant would have the right to recover the por-
tion of the purchase price he had paid, and also the amount he had neces-
sarily expended, in good faith, in the installation of the plant.") ; National
Sand & Gravel Co. v. R. H. Beaumont Co., (1931) 9 N. J. Misc. 1026, 156
Atl. 441 (Court relies on Uniform Sales Act sec. 69 (Id) in allowing buyer
to recover price paid on rescission, and on Uniform Sales Act sec. 69 (6) in
allowing buyer to recover expenses incurred in installation of machinery.
Court does not mention Uniform Sales Act, sec. 69 (2) which prohibits a
buyer from being granted two kinds of relief.).4 9Lake v. Western Silo Co., (1916) 177 Iowa 735, 158 N. W. 673
. . we think the trial court properly instructed that plaintiff might
recover, not only the money paid, but the expense he was put to in at-
tempting to erect the structure.").
50Mooney v. Cyriacks, (1921) 185 Cal. 70, 195 Pac. 922 (Buyer
rescinded purchase of automobile for seller's fraud and recovered part pay-
ment of price plus money expended for license fee and automobile insurance.).
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loss of time.5 2
The recovery of such expenses and damages is quasi contractual
in the sense that the buyer is recovering in a contractual form of
remedy, but is not recovering on a breach of contract. He is not
recovering on a breach of contract because there is no contract, it
having been rescinded by the buyer for breach of warranty or
avoided for the seller's fraud.
At the same time it seems that to allow the buyer to recover
such expenses or damages is in violation of the principles of
quasi contract. The seller is not enriched by the money which the
ouyer pays to the railroad company for freight charges nor by
the other expenses incurred by the buyer. No other doctrine of
quasi contract seems to justify a recovery. The cases under
discussion seem therefore to be instances where quasi contractual
recovery is allowed in violation of the principles of quasi contract.
Situation B 12. Rescinding buyer does not return the goods.
In certain cases, a buyer who rescinds for breach of warranty or
avoids for the seller's fraud, may recover the price paid even
though he does not restore the status quo by returning the goods
to the seller. 3
In the cases cited, the buyer had resold some of the goods
or had consumed some of them in testing, before learning of the
breach of warranty or the fraud. The contract in each case was
5
'Granette Products Co. v. Arthur H. Neumann & Co., (1925) 200
Iowa 572, 205 N. W. 205 ("But where the contract contemplates the fur-
nishing of material for a particular purpose, as the erection of a structure,
and the purchaser expends money in attempting to so use it, and later
rescinds the contract because of the failure of the material to comply with
the contract, he is entitled to be put in statu quo; and this includes the
recovery of not only the money he has paid under the contract, but also
the reasonable expense he was put to in attempting to use the material for
the contemplated purpose."); Way v. Siddall, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 299
S. W. 313 (Affirmance of lower court judgment which allowed buyer, who
rescinded for seller's fraud, to recover price paid plus the amount of money
paid out by the buyer in attempting to use the machine).
r2 Fuller v. Cameron, (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 209 S. W. 711 ("When
the right to rescind was established, it was the further duty of the court
to award appellant [buyer] judgment for all money paid on the contract,
. .. and all special or consequential damages or expenses incurred in respect
to the contract as a result of the misrepresentation.").
r3Restatement, 2 Contracts, secs. 349, 480.
There is a statement in 2 Williston, Sales, sec. 649 that if a defrauded
party "is unable to restore what he has received, rescission is impossible,"
but this statement has probably been abrogated by sec. 480 of the Restate-
ment of Contracts.
The law is complicated by the fact that the Uniform Sales Act, sec. 69(3) requires a buyer who rescinds for breach of warranty "to return the
goods to the seller in substantially as good condition as they were in at
the time the property was transferred to the buyer."
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separable. The buyer was allowed to recover what he had paid
less a deduction for the part of the goods not returned. 54 The buy-
er's recovery was quasi contractual.r5
Situation B 13. Buyer defaults after paying a part of the
price. In a case where the buyer pays a part of the price and then
wilfully refuses to go on with his performance, the seller not being
in default, the majority rule is that the buyer cannot recover any
part of the price paid.", There are some courts, however, which
allow the buyer to recover the price paid less the amount of
damages caused to the seller by the buyer's breach."
54Ideal Coated Paper Co. v. Samuel Cupples Envelope Co., (1912)
169 Ill. App. 484; Dunbar-Dukate Co. v. Martin Fountain & Co., (1930)
171 La. 391, 131 So. 185; Reed v. David Stott Flour Mills, (1921) 216
Mich. 616, 185 N. W. 715; Krzyszke v. Ohio & Michigan Coal Co., (1928)
241 Mich 487, 217 N. W. 403; Clifford v. Stewart, (1922) 153 Minn. 382,
190 N. W. 613; Fiterman v. J. N. Johnson & Co., (1923) 156 Minn. 201,
194 N. W. 399; Rice v. Levinger, (1933) 141 Or. 413, 18 P. (2d) 221;
Rowland v. Divall, [1923] 2 K B. 500 (Seller of automobile breached im-
plied condition of right to sell, the automobile being a stolen one. Buyer
recovered price paid, although the automobile was in the possession of the
police and could not be restored to the seller.).
z5 Woodward, Quasi Contracts, sec. 23; Restatement, Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft, 1935, sec. 58.
562 Williston, Sales, sec. 599 j; Woodward, Quasi Contracts, sec. 177;
Goble, Quasi Contracts-Right of Defaulting Plaintiff, (1927) 22 Ill. L.
Rev. 315.
Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 357 (la and lb) recovery is denied where
the buyer's breach is wilful except in certain special circumstances.
Palmer v. Aeolian Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 746 cert.
denied (1931) 283 U. S. 851, 51 Sup. Ct. 560, 75 L. Ed. 1458; Alabama
Tailoring Co. v. Judkins, (1921) 205 Ala. 601, 88 So. 865; Tomboy Gold
and Copper Co. v. D. 0. Marks, (1921) 185 Cal. 336, 197 Pac. 94; San
Francisco Commercial Agency v. Widemann, (1912) 19 Cal. App. 209, 124
Pac. 1056; Foss-Hughes Co. v. Norman, (1923) 32 Del. 108, 119 Atl. 854;
Loeb v. Yovin, (1914) 187 Ill. App. 216; Hanusin v. Materoh, (1929) 255
Ill. App. 27; Weatherman v. Reid, (1922) 62 Mont. 522, 205 Pac. 251;
Ellinghouse v. Hansen Packing Co., (1923) 66 Mont. 444, 213 Pac. 1087;
E. H. Gallagher Trucking Co. v. Hudford Co., (1918) 169 N. Y. S. 83;
Bernzweig v. Hyman Levin Co., (1918) 172 N. Y. S. 437; Karp v. R.
Ritter & Co., (1920) 110 Misc, Rep. 668, 180 N. Y. S. 769; Nelson v.
Landesman, (1922) 193 N. Y. S. 574; Laufer v. Burghard, (1932) 146
Misc. Rep. 39, 261 N. Y. S. 364; Dluge v. Whiteson, (1928) 292 Pa. St.
334, 141 Atl. 230; Smith v. Brockway Motor Truck Corp., (1933) 310 Pa.
St. 130, 165 Atl. 9.
572 Williston, Sales, sec. 599 j; Woodward, Quasi Contracts, sec. 177;
Goble, Quasi-Contracts-Right of a Defaulting Plaintiff, (1927) 22 Ill. L.
Rev. 315.
McCrea v. Ford, (1913) 24 Colo. App. 506, 135 Pac. 465 ("Viewed
from the standpoint most favorable to defendant, the record discloses that
plaintiff has been guilty of breaching an executory contract, without in
any manner occasioning defendant damages. Having admitted that he
has $2,500 of plaintiff's money, and making no counterclaim against him for
damages, nothing remained for the trial court to do but enter judgment
against the defendant for that sum.") ; Foster v. Warner, (1926) 42 Idaho
729, 249 Pac. 771, (1929) 47 Idaho 567, 277 Pac. 1117 ("While it would
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The courts which allow the buyer to recover are granting quasi
contractual recovery, in the sense that the buyer is suing in a
contractual form of action, but is not suing for breach of contract.
Professor Woodward believes that such quasi contractual recovery
should not be given."5
Situation B 14. Buyer overpays by mistake. Where the par-
ties contract for the sale of a quantity of goods at a certain price
per unit and where the parties make a mistake as to the quantity
of goods and where the buyer, because of this mistake, pays more
than the seller is entitled to receive, the buyer may recover the
amount of the overpayment. A similar result is reached where
the contract specifies a method for fixing the price and the buyer
by mistake or by the seller's trickery or otherwise pays more
than the price-fixing method calls for. In these cases, the seller
was entitled under the contract to receive a certain amount, but
he actually received more. 9 The buyer's recovery of the over-
seem that respondent [buyer] in the instant case cannot maintain an action
for breach of contract, due to his own failure of performance, he is not
prevented from recovering the amounts advanced, less any damages
sustained by appellant [seller]."); Humphrey v. Sagouspe, (1927) 50 Nev.
157, 254 Pac. 1074 ("The law abhors a forfeiture .... ") ; Crosland v. Sloan,(1928) 123 Or. 243, 261 Pac. 701; Breding v. Champlain Marine & Realty
Co., (1934) 106 Vt. 288, 172 Ati. 625.
,"Woodward, Quasi Contracts, secs. 162-177.
Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 357 (la and lb)-recovery is denied
where the buyer's breach is wilful except in certain special circumstances.
Professor Williston apparently favors the minority rule allowing re-
covery by the buyer. 2 Williston, Sales, sec. 599 j.
Professor Goble favors recovery by the buyer-Quasi-Contracts-Right
of a Defaulting Plaintiff, (1927) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 315.
50Baker v. W. J. Kennedy Dairy Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1935) 77 F.
(2d) 574, cert. denied (1935) 296 U. S. 634, 56 Sup. Ct. 157, 80 L. Ed.
451; Barry v. Armstrong, (1923) 161 Ark. 314, 256 S. W. 65; Elijah v.
Burkland, (1923) 80 Ind. App. 359, 140 N. E. 915; Bennett v. Saint Marys
Grain Co., (1917) 100 Kan. 289, 164 Pac. 259 ("The plaintiff was entitled
to his $60.90.") ; Howard J. Hodgson v. John Deere Plow Co., (1919) 104
Kan. 237, 178 Pac. 607; Smith v. Hanson, (1920) 106 Kan. 32, 187 Pac.
262; Fielding v. Williamson, (1925) 118 Kan. 44, 411, 234 Pac. 48, 1003;
Foster Machine Co. v. Covel Mfg. Co., (1922) 219 Mich. 455, 189 N. W.
228; Bone v. Friday, (1914) 180 Mo. App. 577, 167 S. W. 599 ("If the
plaintiff paid in excess of the purchase price for the property and defendant
received such excess . . ., equity and good conscience demand that she re-
turn it ... .") ; Smart v. Valencia, (1927) 50 Nev. 359, 261 Pac. 655 ("While
certain equity principles are involved, this is not an equity case, but a suit
at law for money had and received.") ; Freeman v. Ralph Realty Corp.,
(1921) 198 App. Div. 788, 191 N. Y. S. 72 ("Plaintiff sufficiently shows
that he relied upon the erroneous estimate in good faith, and he is there-
fore entitled to be relieved from the mistake and to recover for the over-
payment, which was made through mutual mistake of fact, as for money
had and received for which the law implies a promise to repay.");
Haubert v. Navajo Refining Co., (1928) 129 Okla. 195, 264 Pac. 151;
Jewett State Bank v. Corsicana Nat'l Bank, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167
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payment is quasi contractual. 0
Situation B 15. Seller compels buyer to pay more than the
contract price. This situation deals with the cases where a seller
refuses to deliver the goods to the buyer unless the buyer will
pay a sum in excess of the contract price. If the buyer pays the
overcharge and later sues to recover it, some courts deny recovery,
saying in substance that the payment was voluntary.6'
But there are other courts which allow the buyer to recover
such overcharge, taking the position that the payment was made
under a form of duress, sometimes called business compulsion or
duress of property. 62 The buyer's recovery in such a case is quasi
contractual.6
S. W. 747 (The representative of the seller "was in the possession of
money of another, which in honesty and good conscience it ought not to
retain. . . ."); Midgley & Curtsinger v. Taylor, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914)
17M S. W. 301 ("Reason and common sense plainly indicate that he was
damaged in the sum of $500. . . . He wanted his money back, and the
court in justice and good conscience, gave it to him.").
6oWoodward, Quasi Contracts, sec. 179; Restatement, Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft, 1935, secs. 13, 15, 16.6lDetroit Edison Co. v. Wyatt Coal Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1923) 293
Fed. 489; Detroit Edison Co. v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., (C.C.A. 4th
Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 495; Shell Oil Co. v. Cy Miller, Inc., (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1931) 53 F. (2d) 74; New Jersey Brick Co. v. A. M. Krantz Co., (1919)
94 N. J. L. 255, 109 Atl. 350; Boss v. Hutchinson, (1918) 182 App. Div. 88,
169 N. Y. S. 513; Mandel v. National Ice & Coal Co., (1920) 180 N. Y. S.
429; Mutual Sales Agency v. Hori, (1927) 145 Wash. 236, 259 Pac. 712
(but see contra Ferguson v. Associated Oil Co., (1933) 173 Wash. 672,
24 P. (2d) 82).
62Gilmore v. Texas Co., (1930) 100 Fla. 169, 129 So. 587 (Buyer paid
more than contract price but it is not clear whether seller compelled the
excess payment or whether buyer did not know that he was being over-
charged. The court quoted from another case as follows: "A common
count for money payable to the plaintiff for money had and received by the
defendant for the use of the plaintiff is applicable in all cases where the de-
fendant has obtained money which, ex aequo et bono, he ought to refund.") ;
Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Hollingshead & Blei, (1916) 202 Ill. App. 177
("It is a well-settled rule of law in this state that where one is compelled
to pay money to another, who has no legal right to demand it, in order
to prevent injury to his person, business or property, such payment is,
in law, made under duress, and may be recovered back from the party
receiving it, and it makes no difference that the payment was made with
full knowledge."); Brown v. Worthington, (1912) 162 Mo. App. 508, 142
S. W. 1082 (". .. the precepts of equity and good conscience suggest that
money so obtained is wrongfully withheld from and should be returned to
plaintiff.") ; Ferguson v. Associated Oil Co., (1933) 175 Wash. 672, 24 P.
(2d) 82 ("The rule is that, where money, illegally exacted, is paid to
prevent the sacrifice of capital investments, and made under business com-
pulsion, it may be recovered back, if paid under protest." This case reaches
the opposite result from that in Mutual Sales Agency v. Hori, (1927) 145
Wash. 236, 259 Pac. 712 but the Ferguson Case does not mention the
Mutual case.)
63See Restatement, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Proposed Final
Draft, sec. 70.
Comment (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1413; comment (1933) 33 Col. L.
Rev. 1030.
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Situation B 16. Conditional seller retakes goods on buyer's
failure to pay. Where a conditional seller retakes the goods be-
cause the buyer has defaulted in the payment of the price, there-
being no conditional sales statute, the courts differ as to whether
the buyer may recover the payments he has made.6
There are a substantial number of common law cases which
allow the recovery of either the entire price paid or else the entire
price less the amount of depreciation of the goods or the value
of their use. 5
The theory of the buyer's recovery seems to be that there has
been a rescission of the conditional sales contract. 6 The buyer's
recovery is quasi contractual. 7
Situation B 17. Conditional seller wrongfully retakes the
goods. Under the ordinary contract of conditional sale, the pos-
session of the goods is delivered to the buyer and the buyer is
entitled to retain such possession as long as he continues to per-
form the obligations placed upon him by the contract.6 8 If the
seller does retake the goods at a time when the buyer is not in
default, such retaking is wrongful, and the buyer may repudiate
the contract and recover the price paid.69 The writer regards the
buyer's recovery of the price paid as quasi contractual."
64Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, sec. 130.
65Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, sec. 130.
Sterchi Bros. Co. v. Harris, (1933) 47 Ga. App. 772, 171 S. E. 457
("... the plaintiff is entitled to restitution in the amount which the plain-
tiff had already paid upon the purchase-money of the property retaken.");
Moyer v. Hyde, (1922) 35 Idaho 161, 204 Pac. 1068; Quality Clothes Shop
v. Kenney, (1915) 57 Ind. App. 500, 106 N. E. 541 (The sellers ". . . having
instituted this [replevin] suit and retaken the goods, they thereby abandon-
ed the right to treat the sale as absolute . . . and they must account to
appellee [buyer] on equitable principles for the amount paid on the pur-
chase price less any damages to the property, together with the value of
the use of the property by appellee.").613Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, sec. 130.67The argument that the buyer's recovery, of payments made under a
contract which is later rescinded, is quasi contractual, is set forth in Situa-
tion B 10.
r 8Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, sec. 18.
"clBogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales secs. 18, 30.
Bray v. Lowery, (1912) 163 Cal. 256, 124 Pac. 1004; Anderson v.
Van Camp Sea Food Co., (1929) 98 Cal. App. 787, 277 Pac. 1099 (The
wrongful retaking by the sellers ". . . amounted to a rescission and
abandonment of the contract by the appellants [sellers], and authorized the
instituting of this suit in assumpsit against . . ." the sellers to recover the
price paid.); Daskalopoulos v. Mfulvanity, (1920) 79 N. H. 533, 111 Atl.
832 (Upon the wrongful repossession by the seller, the buyer ". . . had
an undoubted right to treat the contract as rescinded and recover the money
he had paid."); Paine v. Meier & Frank Co., (1933) 146 Or. 40, 27 P.(2d) 315, rehearing denied, (1934) 146 Or. 53, 29 P. (2d) 531.
7QThe comments cited in footnote 34 apply with equal force to this
situation.
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This situation could have been included in Situation B 8,
entitled "Seller commits material breach other than as to quality
or quantity," but it appeared better to set it up as a separate
situation with the other conditional sales cases.
Situation B 18. Conditional seller fails to comply with the
redemption and resale provisions of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act. Section 25 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
provides that if the conditional seller fails to comply with sections
18, 19, 20, 21 and 23 of the Act, relating to redemption by the
buyer and resale by the seller, "the buyer may recover from the
seller his actual damages, if any, and in no event less than one-
fourth of the sum of all payments which have been made under
the contract, with interest."'" The buyer's recovery under Section
25 is quasi contractual. 7 2
A similar situation arose under section 65 of the New York
Personal Property Law,7 3 which provided in substance that if the
conditional seller did not resell the goods within a certain time, the
buyer could recover the amount paid.7 4  The buyer's recovery
7"Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales Chapter XV.
Commercial Credit Co. v. Street, (1930) 37 Ariz. 204, 291 Pac. 1003
(". . plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant 'his actual dam-
ages, if any. . . .' ") ; Manhattan Taxi Service Corp. v. Checker Cab
Manufacturing Corp., (1930) 253 N. Y. 455, 171 N. E. 705 ("The cause of
action assumes the legality of the taking, and charges the omission of a
statutory duty in failing to resell thereafter.") ; United States Taxi Corp. v.
-Mogul Finance Corp., (1931) 232 App. Div. 370, 249 N. Y. S. 509; Rost
v. Win. Knabe & Co., Inc., (1935) 154 Misc. Rep. 425, 277 N. Y. S. 896;
Sheely Bros. v. International Harvester Co., (1934) 243 App. Div. 831,
278 N. Y. S. 134; Underwood v. Raleigh Transportation, Equipment &
Construction Co., (1926) 102 W. Va. 305, 135 S. E. 4.
72This is an illustration of a right of recovery which exists because of
a statute and is not based upon the consent of the defendant. The writer
feels that the ordinary conditional seller makes no promise, express or
implied, that if he fails to comply with the redemption and resale provisions
of the Act he will pay to the buyer the amount of the buyer's "actual dam-
ages, if any, and in no event less than one-fourth of the sum of" the
buyer's payments. The seller must pay because the statute so provides and
not because he promised.
The non-consensual nature of the seller's obligation is emphasized by
section 26 of the act which provides in substance that the buyer cannot,
before or at the time of making the conditional sale contract, waive these
rights against the seller and that the seller cannot contract himself out of
these liabilities to the buyer. In view of this section, it might well be
argued that even if the conditional seller did promise to pay what the Act
required him to pay, his duty to do so would still not be consensual.
See also Keener, Quasi-Contracts 16-17.
73Laws 1909, ch. 45.
74Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, sec. 132.
Lanston Monotype Mach. Co. v. Curtis, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1915) 224 Fed.
403 ("Not having sold the machinery at public auction as required by that
law, it was liable to Curtis [buyer] for the amount paid by him on ac-
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under this section was quasi contractual. 71
Situation B 19. Buyer pays a draft to which seller had
attached a spent bill of lading. In an interesting case decided by
the supreme court of Washington,76 the facts were that the seller
had been the owner of a carload of shingles and had received the
shingles from the carrier without the surrender of the bill of lading.
The report does not state whether the bill of lading was a straight
bill or an order bill. The seller stored the goods in a warehouse
to its own order. Later the seller contracted to sell "a carload of
shingles" to the buyer, apparently as if the shingles were still
in the hands of the carrier and this was the buyer's impression.
The seller drew a draft on the buyer for the price and attached
the spent bill of lading and the buyer paid the draft and received
the spent bill of lading.
After the buyer learned all of the facts he sued to recover what
he had paid and was successful. The court said:
"The appellant [buyer] did not receive what the respondent
[seller] purported to sell it, and did not receive what it desired
to purchase, or what the respondent [seller] led it to believe it
was purchasing. There was thus a failure of consideration for
the purchase money, and the appellant [buyer] is entitled to
recover it ...."
The recovery granted to the buyer in this case was quasi con-
tractual. 7" The case is simply a variation of a case of material
breach by the seller and could have been covered in Situation B 8,
but the facts are unusual and interesting and seemed to deserve
separate treatment.
count."); Crowe v. Liquid Carbonic Co., (1913) 208 N. Y. 396, 102 N. E.
F73; Adler v. Weis & Fisher Co., (1916) 218 N. Y. 295. 112 N. E. 1049;
Hillelson v. Old Reliable Motor Truck Corp., (1924) 239 N. Y. 553, 147
N. E. 192; Rivara v. James Stewart & Co., (1925) 241 N. Y. 259, 140 N. E.
851 aff'd (1927) 274 U. S. 614, 147 Sup. Ct. 718, 71 L. Ed. 1234 ("Its [the
statute's] underlying thought is that a conditional vendor shall be made to
do the fair thing by his conditional vendee. To avoid hardship and oppres-
sion, he must either put up for sale the retaken chattels, and give credit for
the proceeds, or restore the payments made to him.") ; Cee Bee Cee Waist &
Costume Co. v. Borenstein, (1917) 164 N. Y. S. 703; Dean v. Bauer,
(1917) 101 Misc. Rep. 301, 166 N. Y. S. 983; Goldberg v. Wisner Mfg.
Co., (1918) 170 N. Y. S. 551; Meyer v. Sherwood Automobile Corpora-
tion, (1924) 123 Misc. Rep. 923, 206 N. Y. S. 645 (".... the vendor is liable
in accordance with section 65 of that statute, and it was unnecessary to
prove the vendee's damages.").5The argument is substantially the same as is given in footnote 72
supra. The Personal Property Law, however, contained no prohibition
against a waiver by the buyer of his rights.
71C. A. Mauk Lumber Co. v. Miller Brothers Lumber Co., (1923)
126 Wash. 593, 219 Pac. 28.
"7Restatement, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Ter-t. Draft, sec. 13.
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Situation B 20. Bank issuing a letter of credit overpays seller.
It has been seen that if the buyer overpays the seller, he may
recover the excess payment and his recovery is quasi contractual."8
A variation of this principle was involved in an unusual set
of facts coming up before one of the district courts of appeal of
California. 9 The seller sold $11,500 worth of goods to the buyer
and was to be paid by a letter of credit issued by a large New
York bank. Because of a mistake, apparently on the part of the
New York bank, the letter of credit actually issued was for $13,500
and the New York bank paid the seller $13,500. The assignee of
the New York bank then sued the seller for the $2,000 and
recovered.80 His recovery was quasi contractual.
The case is interesting also because of the fact that the de-
fendant seller interposed one of the standard quasi contract
defenses, namely, change of position. He alleged that he had paid
over the $2,000, but his defense failed because he could not prove
such payment over as a matter of fact. The court did not indicate
that it understood that it was passing on a quasi contract defense.
The scope of the present article does not include the quasi
contract defenses, but it may be pointed out that the quasi contract
defenses are important in the law of sales. It is clear that in a
great many sales cases a seller or a buyer is given quasi contractual
relief. It also is true that in some sales cases a seller or buyer will
be denied relief because the defendant has interposed and sustained
a quasi contract defense. In other words, the law of quasi con-
tract not only may provide a seller or buyer with a cause of action
-it also may provide him with a defense.
Situation B 21. Butyer pays a sales tax to the seller who pays
it to the government-it later is held that the taxing statute did not
authorize the government to collect the tax on the goods in ques-
tion-the government refunds the tax to the seller-the buyer
now sues the seller for a refund. This situation arose under an
Act of Congress x which levied a ten per cent tax on the sale of
certain beverages. In the cases mentioned hereafter, the buyer of
cider paid the tax to the seller and the seller paid the tax to the
government. It was later held that cider was not taxable under
78Situation B 14.79Burckard v. Smith, (1926) 80 Cal. App. 104, 251 Pac. 663 ("It is
now settled . . . that money paid under a mistake of fact may be recovered
back. .. ").80Although the assignee of a bank, rather than a buyer or a seller,
is the plaintiff in this case so that the case is strictly not within the scope
of this article, the writer advisedly included it.81Revenue Act of 1918, sec. 628 (a), 40 Stat. at L. 1117.
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the statute,82 and the seller in each of these cases recovered from
the government the amount of tax he had paid. The buyer then
proceeded to sue seller for a refund.
In 1925, in Kastner v. Duffy-Mott Co.s 3 the New York supreme
court, appellate term, denied the recovery by the buyer. In 1926
the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, in the case of
Heckinan & Co. v. I. S. Dawes & Son Co.8 4 also denied recovery
by the buyer, relying in part on the Kastner Case.
But in 1927, the New York court of appeals, in the case of
Wayne County Produce Co. v. Dutffy-Mott Co."' overruled the
Kastner Case and held that the buyer could recover. 6
The recovery by the buyer, granted by the New York court
of appeals, was quasi contractual, although the buyer was really
recovering a benefit conferred under a mistake of law."' The fol-
lowing quotation from Judge Cardozo's opinion seems to show
that he regarded the recovery as quasi contractual:
"The distinction is unimportant, at least for present purposes,
between mistakes of fact and those of law. The quality of the
mistake did not prevent the defendant [seller] from recovering
the money from the government. It cannot absolve from the duty
of disposing of the money thus recovered as good conscience shall
dictate."88
Situation B 22. 'Seller bribes buyer's purchasing agent. The
present situation arises where the seller bribes the buyer's pur-
chasing agent, apparently hoping that the purchasing agent will
help the seller to get more business from the buyer or to get higher
prices for the merchandise sold. Then when the buyer learns of
the bribery, he goes to court on the theory that he has been over-
charged and contends that the amount of the bribe has been added
to the price he has had to pay. The terminology used is that the
price had been "loaded" with the amount of the bribe.
The writer has found only three cases decided since 1912 in
82),fonroe Cider Vinegar & Fruit Co. v. Riordan, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1922) 280 Fed. 624; Casey v. Sterling Cider Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1923)
294 Fed. 426.
'1(1925) 125 Misc. Rep. 886, 213 N. Y. S. 128.
"4(1926) 56 App. D. C. 213, 12 F. (2d) 154.
85(1927) 244 N. Y. 351, 155 N. E. 669.
SGThe matter is discussed in Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional
Statute 223-225, but the author discusses the law on the basis of the
Kastner Case and the Heckman Case, and fails to mention the Wayne
County Produce Co. Case.
87Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, ch. 3; Restatement, Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft, 1935, secs. 39, 40, 41 and Explanatory
Notes, pages 284 to 291.
s8'(1927) 244 N. Y. 351, 354-355, 155 N. E. 669, 670.
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which the situation was presented, and all of them were decided
in New York.
In the first of them, the buyer had consumed the goods entirely
before learning of the bribery and then sued to recover the total
price paid. Judge Cardozo, writing the opinion of the Court, said
in substance that the buyer could not recover the total price paid,
but only the difference, if any, between the amount actually paid
and the value of the goods. The buyer's complaint was held to
state no cause of action.9
In the second case, the buyer sued the seller to recover a sum
equal to the amount of the bribe, claiming that there was a pre-
sumption in such a case that the seller "loaded" the price to the
extent of the amount of the bribe. The court said there was no
such presumption, and that the seller would not be liable if he
could show, as he was at liberty to do, that the price was fair and
contained no "loading." The buyer's motion for summary judg-
ment was denied. 9
In the third case all of the judges concurred in Judge Pound's
opinion, except Judge Cardozo, who was not sitting. The lower
court had instructed the jury that even though the buyer proved
the bribery, he was entitled only to nominal damages unless he
proved a disparity between the value of the goods received and
the price paid, and on this instruction the jury entered a verdict
for the buyer in the amount of six cents.
Judge Pound distinguished the case where a buyer is suing for
the return of the total price paid from the case where the buyer
is suing only for a sum equal to the amount of the bribe paid.
He said:
"The law does not go so far as to nullify the entire transaction
where the vendee has received and used the merchandise. If, how-
ever, a vendor bribes a purchaser's agent it must be assumed that
the purchase money is loaded by the amount of the bribe."
The judgment on the verdict for six cents was set aside and the
buyer was granted a new trial.91
The law of New York seems to be then, that the buyer can
recover the amount that the price has been loaded, and that prima
89Schank v. Schuchman, (1914) 212 N. Y. 352, 106 N. E. 127.90 serman v. J. E. Long Coal Co., (1924) 122 Misc. Rep. 822, 204
N. Y. S. 98, aff'd (1924) 209 App. Div. 882, 205 N. Y. S. 929.
91Donemar, Inc. v. Molloy, (1930) 252 N. Y. 360, 169 N. E. 610("The vendor has had and received money which belongs to the purchaser
to the extent of the bribe which neither the vendor nor the unfaithful agent
may in conscience and good morals retain.").
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facie at least the amount of the loading is equal to the amount of
the bribe.02
The writer is of the opinion that a recovery by the buyer would
be quasi contractual.9 3
Situation B 23. Buyer pays price to a person other than the
seller. In an unusual case,14 the facts were that the plaintiffs, who
were grain dealers, bought a carload of oats from one Decker.
The plaintiffs made a mistake in their bookkeeping, however, and
entered the oats as having been purchased from the defendant.
The plaintiffs paid the defendant for this carload of oats and
brought suit, when they learned of their mistake, for the amount
so paid. The judgment entered for the plaintiffs upon a directed
verdict was affirmed. The buyer's recovery was quasi contractual. 5
Situation B 24. Bargain is illegal. The ordinary rule in the
case of an illegal bargain for the purchase of goods is that the
court will refuse to enforce it for either party.98 The general
reason for the court's refusal to enforce the bargain is that the
plaintiff was blameworthy in entering into it. But if the plaintiff
was not too blameworthy under all the circumstances, the court
may enforce the bargain and treat it as a contract. 7
The same general theory is applicable to a buyer who enters
into an illegal bargain for the purchase of goods and who there-
after repudiates it and asks for the recovery of the price paid. The
court generally will refuse to award restitution to the buyer,
except in certain types of cases.9 8
Among the types of situations where the court will order the
recovery of the price paid is where the bargain has not been
executed and the illegal purpose has not been consummated."
02Donemar, Inc. v. Molloy, (1930) 252 N. Y. 360, 169 N. E. 610.
11It will be observed from the quotation in footnote 91 supra that
Judge Pound uses quasi contract phraseology in discussing the basis of the
buyer's recovery.9'Stair v. Marquart, (1920) 45 N. D. 384, 178 N. W. 121.
95Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, sec. 15: Restatement, Restitution and Un-just Enrichment, Tent. Draft, sec. 11.
9133 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1630; 2 Williston, Sales, sec. 663; Re-
statement, 2 Contracts, sec. 598.
973 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1631, 1632; 2 Williston, Sales, sec. 663;
Restatement, 2 Contracts, secs. 599, 601, 602, 603, 606, 607.
01;2 Williston, Sales, secs. 679, 680; 3 Williston, Contracts, secs. 1788-
1791; Restatement, 2 Contracts, secs. 599, 600, 601, 604, 605.
VoKahn v. Rosenstiel, (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 298 Fed. 656; Brashears v.
Giannini, (1933) 131 Cal. App. 706, 22 P. (2d) 47, cert. denied (1933) 290
U. S. 700 ("The contract ... afforded no consideration for the money paid,
and recovery could be had in an action for money had and received.");
Harrington v. Boschenski, (1922) 140 Md. 24, 116 Atl. 836 (". . . the
plaintiff had the right . . . to sue for and recover the consideration paid
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Another is where the buyer is not in par delicto with the seller. 00
Another is where the bargain is illegal because of a statute enacted
specifically for the protection of the buyer.10 ' The recovery of
the buyer in each of these situations is quasi contractual. 10 2
II. THE SELLER AS PLAINTIFF
Situation S 1. No contract exists. If a seller delivers goods to
a buyer without there being any contract, express or implied in
fact between them, a quasi contract situation may arise. In order
for the quasi contractual relief to be proper it must appear both that
no express contract exists and also that the buyer has not made
an implied in fact promise to pay for the goods.
This situation appeared in a number of cases:
First: The parties entered into negotiations to form a con-
tract but no contract resulted because of the lack of an expression
of mutual assent. W\Vhile the negotiations were pending the seller
delivered goods to the buyer and the buyer apparently consumed
or disposed of them before the non-existence of the express con-
tract was discovered.
10 3
Second: - The seller's business was transferred by the original
proprietor to a new proprietor without an assignment of the old
proprietor's contract with the buyer if one existed-the new pro-
prietor delivered goods to the buyer who thought the original
proprietor was delivering them.1
0 4
by him, not upon the contract, but independently of it.") ; Boyer v. Garner,
(Mo. App. 1929) 15 S. W. (2d) 893 (". . . the purchaser should be per-
mitted to repudiate the contract and recover his money paid. .. .")
10oStacy v. Brothers, (1919) 93 Conn. 690, 107 Atl. 613; Groves v.
Jones, (1930) 252 Mich. 446, 233 N. W. 375 ("Having determined that the
parties are not in par delicto . . . it follows that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover on the common counts the money he paid for the cattle.") ; Grande
v. Eagle Brewing Co., (1922) 44 R. I. 424, 117 Atl. 640 ("The plaintiff
[buyer] . . . had an action . . . to recover back the money because it was
received without consideration."); Haug & Nellermoe v. Murdoch, (Sas-
katchewan, 1916) 9 S. L. R. 56, 26 D. L. R. 200.
X0'Badger Coal & Coke Co. v. Sterling Midland Coal Co., (1923)
180 Wis. 79, 192 N. W. 461; Haug & Nellermoe v. Murdoch, (Saskatche-
wan 1916) 9 S. L. R. 56, 26 D. L. R. 200.
10 2Woodward, Quasi Contracts, ch. VIII; Restatement, 2 Contracts,
secs. 598-609.
10 3 National Rosin Oil & Size Co. v. South Atlantic Coal Co., (1918)
23 Ga. App. 87, 97 S. E. 559 ("... no valid contract existed between them
. . . and . . . the plaintiff [seller] was entitled to recover the market value
of the coal delivered. . . ." The court does not raise the question as to the
possible existence of an implied-in-fact contract).
See Costigan, Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent, (1920) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 376; Woodward, Quasi Contracts, secs. 8, 52.
104 1ferkel v. St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co., (Mo. App. 1916) 190 S. W.
611 ("The action proceeds in quantum meruit for the recovery of the
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Third: The buyer's business was transferred by the original
proprietor to a new proprietor-the seller shipped goods as ordered
by the original proprietor-the goods were received and used by
the new proprietor.10 '
Fourth: Owing to mutual mistake the seller delivered the
goods to the buyer and the buyer used them-but the seller and
buyer actually had made no express nor implied in fact contract. 10
In each of these cases, the seller could not recover from the
buyer on a contract because there was no contract between them,
or at least the Court decided that there was no contract between
them. The seller did recover the value of the goods delivered to
the buyer, however, and the seller's recovery in each case was
quasi contractual.
0 7
Situation S 2. Buyer comnmits a material breach after part
performance by seller. Where the seller delivers goods to the
buyer (the seller not having fully performed the contract nor a
divisible part thereof) and the buyer thereafter commits a material
breach of the contract, the seller has the privilege of repudiating the
contract and of recovering the value of the goods delivered. 8
His recovery in such a case is quasi contractual. 09
Situation S 3. Buyer induces contract by fraud or misrepre-
sentation. If a buyer by fraud or material misrepresentation in-
duces a seller to enter into a sale or a contract to sell, the trans-
reasonable value of the goods accepted and retained by defendant [buyer],
as being the extent of the benefits thus conferred upon defendant. And a
recovery may be had upon what is termed a 'quasi-contract,' or a contract
strictly implied by law."
But see contra: Parker v. Dantzler Foundry & Machine Works, (1918)
118 Miss. 126, 79 So. 82.
The classic discussion of this situation is by the late Professor Costigan
in, The Doctrine of Boston Ice Company v. Potter, (1907) 7 Col. L. Rev. 32.
'10 Cary v. Simpson & Harper, (1914) 15 Ga. App. 280, 82 S. E. 918
(If the defendant partnership accepted and used the goods shipped "...
there would be an implied promise to pay." The court does not raise the
question as to the possibility of there being an implied-in-fact contract).
'"6Turnipseed v. Burton, (1912) 4 Ala. App. 612, 58 So. 959 ("Does
Turnipseed, in equity and good conscience, owe Burton for the crates?").
'
07Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, Ch. IV; Restatement, Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft, 1935 secs. 34, 11.
1082 Williston, Sales, sees. 592-593; Restatement, 2 Contracts, secs.
347, 350, 351.
O'Beirne v. Greenberg, (1914) 86 Misc. Rep. 49, 148 N. Y. S. 85
(". .. but defendant [buyer] violated . . . his agreement to give a chattel
mortgage, and on that default plaintiff [seller] was entitled to recover the
value of the goods sold and delivered... ." The case is unsatisfactory, how-
ever, because it does not appear whether the seller had delivered a part
or all of the goods.)
'
0 9The comments cited in footnote 34 apply with equal force to this
situation.
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action will be voidable by the seller.1 - The nature of the buyer's
fraud or misrepresentation may also be such as to prevent any
sale or contract to sell from ever coming into existence.'1" In
either case, the seller may recover the value of the goods he may
have delivered to the buyer," 2 and his recovery is quasi con-
tractual."'
Situation S 4. Seller delivers less than the agreed quantity.
The rights of a seller who delivers less goods than he agreed to
deliver are stated in section 44 (1) of the Uniform Sales Act.
The first sentence of section 44 (1) provides that:
"Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods
less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them, but if
the buyer accepts or retains the goods so delivered, knowing that
the seller is not going to perform the contract in full, he must pay
for them at the contract rate."
The buyer's obligation to pay the contract price under this sen-
tence is contractual, being based on a substituted contract.,"4  The
buyer cannot be held on the original contract, because the seller
has committed a material breach thereof.
The second sentence of Section 44 (1) reads as follows:
"If, however, the buyer has used or disposed of the goods
delivered before he knows that the seller is not going to perform
his contract in full, the buyer shall not be liable for more than the
fair value to him of the goods so received."
The seller cannot recover on the original contract because he has
committed a material breach thereof and he cannot recover on a
substituted contract because there is no substituted contract. His
recovery of the value of the goods under this sentence is quasi
contractual.",'
1102 Williston, Sales, Ch. XXV; Restatement, 2 Contracts sec. 476.
112 Williston, Sales, sec. 625; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 475.
1122 Williston, Sales, sec. 647; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 488,
Illustration 3; Restatement, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft,
1935 sec. 23.
American Woolen Co. v. Samuelsohn (1919) 226 N. Y. 61, 123 N. E.
154 ("The rescission of the contract of sale does not prevent the plaintiff
[seller] from recovering as upon an implied promise to pay the value of
the goods delivered to the defendants [buyers] and actually used by them.
The plaintiff cannot, however, recover therefor upon the express contract
of sale which it has rescinded." The value of this case is lessened by the
fact that the seller's recovery was barred by the statute of limitations. The
court decided that the statute commenced to run from the time of the de-
livery of the goods and not from the expiration of the four months' credit
period.)
"13Restatement, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Tent. Draft, sec. 23.
1142 Williston, Sales, sec. 460; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 357, Com-
ment j.
"'5Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, sec. 176; 2 Williston, Sales, sec. 460;
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In the case cited, the court sustained the buyer's contention
that where the seller delivers less than the agreed amount of goods
and the buyer disposes of them before he knows that the seller's
delivery will be insufficient as to quantity, the buyer is liable only
for the value of the goods received. 116
Situation S 5. Seller delivers goods of defective quality. When
the seller delivers materially defective goods he ordinarily is
guilty of a breach of warranty. The recovery of a seller-plaintiff
who is guilty of a breach of warranty and whose litigation is
handled by the parties and the court on a breach of warranty basis,
is discussed elsewhere in this article.11
It may be true that the seller who delivers goods of materially
defective quality made no express or implied warranty or that the
litigation is handled by the parties and the court as if there were
no warranty. In either event, we have the situation of a seller,
who has delivered materially defective goods, suing for the price
or the value of the goods. He cannot recover on the original
contract because he has committed a material breach." 8
Section 44 (1) of the Uniform Sales Act specifically covers
the situation where the seller's delivery is deficient as to quantity,
but (excluding the breach of warranty sections) there is no similar
3 Williston, Contracts, sees. 1473-1485; Restatement, 2 Contracts sec. 357.
It is interesting to note that section 357 of the Restatement of Con-
tracts, entitled "Restitution in favor of a plaintiff who is himself in de-
fault," contains three additional provisions relating to the seller's quasi-
contractual recovery not expressly included in the second sentence of sec-
tion 44 (1). These three provisions are substantially as follows:
I) The plaintiff's breach or non-performance must not be "wilful
and deliberate";
2) The plaintiff's recovery shall not exceed a ratable proportion of
the contract price;
3) From the plaintiff's recovery shall be deducted the damages caused
to the buyer by the seller's breach of contract.
The three provisions are common law rules applicable to the quasi-
contract recovery in question. Since the second sentence of section 44 (1)
is a codification of this' same remedy, it would seem that these three pro-
visions should be read into the sentence by implication. In other words,
a seller who is suing under the second sentence of section 44 (1) probably
must show that his breach was not "wilful and deliberate," his recovery will
be limited to a ratable proportion of the contract price, and from his re-
covery will be deducted the damages caused to the buyer by the seller's
breach of contract.
""oGuaranty Trust Co. v. Gerseta Corporation, (1925) 212 App. Div.
76, 208 N. Y. S. 270 (The court quotes from 2 Williston, Sales, sec. 460
where Professor Williston de.scribes the present type of recovery as quasi-
contractual.).
117 Situation S 6.
1182 Williston, Contracts, sec. 842; Restatement, 1 Contracts sec. 266
et seq.
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section covering the situation where his delivery is defective as
to quality.
The two situations are similar, however, and similar results
should be reached. Thus, if the buyer accepts or retains the goods
after he knows that they are materially defective as to quality
and while he still is reasonably able to return them, he is liable
for the contract price thereof or for a ratable proportion of the
contract price, minus the damages caused by the seller's breach.119
This liability is contractual, being based on a substituted contract.12"
If however, the buyer has used or disposed of the goods before
he knew that they were materially defective, and if the seller's
breach or non-performance was not "wilful and deliberate," the
seller can recover their value, not exceeding "a ratable propor-
tion of the agreed compensation," minus the damages caused to
the buyer by the seller's breach of contract.121 This recovery is
quasi contractual.
22
In the cases cited, quasi contractual recovery of the type dis-
cussed was allowed.
123
Situation S. 6. Recoupment by buyer. Where the buyer sets
up a "breach of warranty by way of recoupment in diminution or
extinction of the price," as he may under the Uniform Sales
Act,124 a quasi contract situation exists.125 The buyer in such a
case has accepted the goods in spite of the breach of warranty, but
because of the breach of warranty "is allowed to avoid the con-
tract which was made and substitute in its stead a quasi contrac-
tual obligation for the value of what he has received.'
28
It will be observed that the doctrine of a substituted contract,
which was mentioned in Situation S 5, has no place where the
" Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 357.
1202 Williston, Sales, sec. 460; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 357, Com-
ment 3.
"2'Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 357.
"'2Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, sec. 176; 3 Williston, Contracts, secs.
1473-1485; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 357.
'12Standard Growers Exchange v. Howard, (1921) 82 Fla. 97, 89 So.
345 (The tomatoes delivered by plaintiffs were defective and ". . . they
cannot recover the contract price. There was a common count, however,
for goods bargained and sold upon which the plaintiffs could recover on a
quantum valebant for the value of the tomatoes, and as the defendant's own
evidence ... shows that it received something of value for the tomatoes,
the plaintiffs should have recovered as much as the tomatoes were worth.") ;
Monarch Metal Weather-Strip Co. v. Hanick, (1913) 172 Mo. App. 680,
155 S. W. 858.
See also Walls v. Tinsley, (1915) 187 Mo. App. 462, 173 S. W. 19.
124Sec. 69 (la).
.252 Williston, Sales, secs. 605, 612.
1282 Williston, Sales, sec. 605.
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buyer may and does treat the delivery of defective goods as a
breach of warranty and sets up the breach of warranty by way of
recoupment. In the recoupment situation, the buyer may accept
or keep the goods,1 27 even after he knows of the breach of war-
ranty,12 1 and not be liable for their contract price on the theory
of a substituted contract, but only for their value on the theory of
quasi contract. 
2
In the cases cited, the buyer was allowed recoupment for
breach of warranty and the seller recovered the value of the goods
delivered.'O
Situation S 7. Price fixing method fails. If the sale or the
contract to sell does not state the price of the goods, but rather
provides that the price shall be fixed some time in the future by
valuers or by some other price fixing machinery, then a quasi
contract situation may arise if the price-fixing machinery fails to
function.
In the first place, the buyer's obligations under the sale or
the contract to sell are avoided if the price fixing method fails
because his duty to pay the price is subject to the condition that
the price be fixed in the specified way. 1 ' If the buyer accepts
or keeps the goods with the seller's consent after they both
know that the price fixing machinery is not going to function and
while the buyer is still reasonably able to return them, the buyer
would seem to be liable on a substituted contract for the value of
the goods.
If, however, it appears that the buyer has used or disposed
of the goods before he knew that the price fixing machinery was
not going to function, then the buyer cannot be held on the
original express sale or contract to sell nor on a substituted
contract, but the buyer is still liable to the seller for the value
of the goods received.' 3 2  The buyer's liability in this case is
127Uniform Sales Act, sec. 69 (la).
'
28But the buyer must give notice of the breach of warranty to the
seller, Uniform Sales Act, sec. 49.
292 Williston, Sales, sees. 605, 612.
130Southern Gypsum Co. v. United Paperboard Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1926) 11 F. (2d) 58; Elmer Brothers v. Carpenter, (1919) 42 Cal. App.
206, 183 Pac. 566.131Uniform Sales Act, sec. 10 (1); 1 Williston, Sales, sees. 174, 175;
2 Williston, Contracts, sees. 800, 801.
13'2 Uniform Sales Act, sec. 10 (1); 1 Williston, Sales, sec. 175; 2 Wil-
liston, Contracts, sees. 800, 801.
Merchants' Grocery Co. v. Talladega Grocery Co., (1928) 217 Ala.
334, 116 So. 356; Keime v. Thum, (1925) 238 Ill. App. 519 (". . . the
principle of quasi-contract . . .applies. . . .") ; Spencer v. Treanor, (1922)
79 Ind. App. 178, 137 N. E. 566 (The buyer ". . . has voluntarily received
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quasi contractual. 133
Situation S 8. Statute provides that a customs duty, imposed
after the contract is -nade, may be added to the price by the seller.
In the case of G. G. Crespin & Son v. Colac Co-operative Farmers
Ltd.,14 the plaintiff agreed to sell eighty bales of gunny sacks to
the defendant, to be imported from India into Australia. At
the time of the contract there was no duty on gunny sacks, but
later a duty was imposed and the plaintiff was compelled to pay
duty on the last fifteen bales. The Customs Acts"35 contained a
provision that if a duty were imposed on goods after the contract
was made and before they were imported into Australia, "the
agreement shall be altered" and the seller might add the duty
to the price. The plaintiff [seller], having paid the new duty,
sued the buyer to recover the amount thereof and was allowed
to recover. His recovery was quasi contractual. 36
Situation S 9. Contract is unenforceable because of a Statute
of Frauds. If a plaintiff has conferred a benefit upon a de-
fendant under an oral contract which is unenforceable because of
a statute of frauds, the ordinary rule is that the plaintiff can
recover the value of his performance in quasi contract. 37  This
situation will not arise under a statute which follows Section 17
of the English Statute of Frauds, nor under Section 4 of the
Uniform Sales Act because each of these sections provides in sub-
stance that if the buyer pays a part or all of the price or if the
seller delivers a part of all of the goods, then the statute is satisfied
and the contract, though oral, is enforceable. 8
the other's goods, and derived a benefit therefrom, and ex aequo et bono
ought to pay for them.").
"331 Williston, Sales, sec. 175.
For an extensive discussion of the greatly varied situations where the
price is not fixed at the time when the sale or contract to sell is made, see
Prosser, Open Price in Contracts for the Sale of Goods, (1932) 16 MIN-
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134(Aus. 1916) 21 C. L. R. 205.
3"5See (Aus. 1916) 21 C. L. R. 205, 211.
136This is an illustration of a right of recovery which exists because
of a statute and is not based upon the consent of the buyer. The writer
feels that the ordinary importer-buyer of goods in Australia makes no
promise, express or implied, that if the import duties are increased he will
pay to the seller the amount of the increase. The buyer must pay the in-
crease because the statute "alters" the agreement and not because he
promised to pay it.
See also Keener, Quasi Contracts 16-17.
137Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, ch. VI; Restatement, 2 Contracts, see.
355; 1 Williston, Contracts, secs. 534-537.
"8If the statute provides that part payment of the price by the buyer,
only "at the time" when the contract is made, is sufficient to satisfy the
statute, then a buyer, who paid a part of the price after the contract was
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If, however, the facts are a little different a quasi contract
situation may arise. In the case cited,1  the contract was for
more than the statutory amount and also was not to be performed
within a year. The majority of the court held that there was no
sufficient memorandum of the contract, but there was acceptance
and actual receipt of a part of the goods. The majority held that
the plaintiff [seller] could not recover on the contract because the
contract was not to be performed within a year14° but that the
seller could recover the "reasonable price" of the goods delivered
and not paid for. The seller's recovery was quasi contractual.
14 1
Situation S 10. Bargain is illegal. It has been seen that the
ordinary rule is that a buyer cannot enforce an illegal bargain,
14
2
and the same rule is ordinarily true as to a seller.
14 3
A seller, like a buyer, will ordinarily be denied quasi con-
tractual recovery also.14 4  But there are situations where a seller
who has delivered goods to a buyer under an illegal bargain, will
be allowed to recover their value ;"' among such situations is the
one where the illegality is slight and does not involve "serious
moral turpitude. 1 46  The seller's recovery of the value of the
goods delivered under such an illegal bargain is quasi contractual.
1 47
made, could not enforce it and should be given quasi-contractual recovery
of the amount paid; see 1 Williston, Sales. sec. 99 and Stowe v. Fay Fruit
Co., (1928) 90 Cal. App. 421, 265 Pac. 1042.
1l3David Taylor Co. v. Fansteel Products Co., (1932) 234 App. Div.
548, 255 N. Y. S. 270, affirmed (1933) 261 N. Y. 514, 185 N. E. 718. The
case is commented on in (1932) 17 MINNESOTA LAw RBviEW 107.
141To the effect that a contract for the sale of goods, of more than the
statutory amount and not to be performed within a year, must comply with
both sections 17 and 4 of the Statute of Frauds, see 1 Williston, Sales, sec. 51
and Restatement, 1 Contracts, (1932) sec. 178, Comment b.
14lWoodward, Quasi-Contracts, sec. 95; 1 Williston, Contracts, secs.
534-537; Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 355.
'
42Situation B 24.
1433 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1630; 2 Williston, Sales, sec. 663; Re-
statement, 2 Contracts, sec. 598.
14'Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 598.
1412 Williston, Sales, secs. 679, 680; 3 Williston, Contracts, secs. 1788-
1791; Restatement, 2 Contracts, secs. 599, 600, 601, 604, 605.
14' Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 600, Illustration 3.
Penn-Allen Cement Co. v. Phillips & Southerland, (1921) 182 N. C.
437, 109 S. E. 257 (The buyers are not liable ". . . upon the contract, which
is unlawful, but upon a quantum meruit having accepted the shipment.").
'
47Restatement, 2 Contracts, sec. 600, Illustration 3, in speaking of a
similar slightly illegal bargain, says :-"A [the seller] can rescind the bar-
gain and recover the automobile or its value."
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TABULATION OF ALL THE CASES CITED HEREIN WHERE A SELLER
OR A BUYER HAS BEEN GIVEN QUASI CONTRACTUAL RELIEF
AGAINST THE OTHER, SHOWING HOW THE COURTS
DESCRIBE THE RELIEF THEY ARE GIVING.
No. Per cent
of cases of all
The court does not in any way describe the nature of
the recovery it is giving or at most says, in effect,
that the plaintiff is "entitled to recover" ............... 203 73.0%
The court bases the plaintiff's right to recover on the
fact that he has "rescinded." That is, the court
says, in effect, "The plaintiff, having rescinded, is
entitled to recover, etc ....................-----------------.. -... 17 6.2%
The court uses one of the following expressions:
"equity and good conscience," "honesty and good
conscience," "justice and good conscience," "good
conscience," "ex aequo et bono," "equitable prin-
ciples," or "justice" .-- .....................------------------------ 14 5.0%
The court says, in effect, that the plaintiff may re-
cover because the defendant is holding the money
or goods "without consideration" ........................... 8 2.9%
The court describes the recovery as being in assumpsit
on the common counts, or in assumpsit, or on the
common counts, or on a quantum meruit, or on a
quantum valebant ...................................................... 8 2.9%
The court says that the suit is on an implied promise
or that the law implies a promise --------------- 7 2.5%
The court describes the action as being for money had
and received ---------------------------------------------------------- 5 1.8%
The court says the action is not on a contract or not
on "the contract". ..................................................... 5 1.8%
The court uses the expression "quasi contract" or a
derivative thereof ...................................................... 4 1.4%
The court says, in effect, that "the law" requires that
the plaintiff recover ----------------------------------------------- 3 1.1%
The court speaks of the defendant as being "enriched"
or "unjustly enriched". ............................................. 2 .7%
The court says, in effect, that the plaintiff is entitled
to "restitution". ......................................................... 2 .7%
Total ........................................................ 278 100.0%
THE EXISTENCE OF A PATTERN RUNNING THROUGH THE CASES
HEREIN COVERED
Since this article is a survey of the sales cases decided in the
last twenty-four years in which the plaintiff has been given quasi
contractual recovery, the question arises as to whether any thread
of unity runs through them and whether the cases conform to
any basic pattern.
QUASI CONTRACTS IN SALES CASES
In general, it can be said that since all of the recoveries granted
in these cases were quasi contractual, they should fit into any
pattern into which the entire body of the law of quasi contract
fits. As has been seen in the situations set forth, these sales cases
do adhere quite closely to the general rules of the subject.
Speaking now of the unjust enrichment cases alone, it will be
seen that there is at least one unifying thread upon which they all
may be strung. This thread can be expressed as follows: Where
a sales transaction does not proceed in the orderly manner con-
templated by the parties, but rather suffers some kind of a mis-
carriage, then the law of unjust enrichment will adjust the rights
of the parties in accordance with an ordinary business man's idea
of fairness. This adjustment may take the form of restoring the
price paid by a buyer who has not received his goods or the form
of restoring the value of the goods to a seller who has not been
paid for them.
Another unifying thread appears to be that after the mis-
carriage has occurred, the transaction will be adjusted regardless
of whether the miscarriage was the responsibility of the plaintiff,
or of the defendant, or of neither, or of both. The only dispute
here might be in connection with the case where the plaintiff de-
faults on his performance of the contract or is in some other way
responsible alone for the miscarriage. Even here the plaintiff
recovers if his breach was not wilful and there is some authority
that even if his breach is wilful he may recover. "" His recovery
is the amount by which he enriched the defendant, minus the
damages caused to the defendant by his breach.
The practice of the courts to step in and adjust the confusion
left by the miscarriage of the sales transaction fills an important
need in modern business. Business men are daily entering into a
great number of sales transactions of the greatest variety as to
subject matter, quantity, prices, and terms. Some transactions
are represented by elaborate, counsel-prepared written contracts
while others are to be found only in the face-to-face or telephone
conversations of the parties. When a great volume of business
possessing an infinite variety of detail, is carried on by ordinary
humans, things are bound to go wrong occasionally. It is then
that the right to sue for breach of contract is not adequate, and
it is then that the courts are called upon to look over the situation
and make an adjustment. In making the adjustment the courts
do what ordinary business men would regard as fair, namely, they
148See footnote 58 supra.
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restore to the buyer-plaintiff, the price he has paid and they
restore to the seller-plaintiff the value of the goods he has delivered.
Because of the miscarriage the plaintiff will not get what he
contracted for and the courts give him the next best thing under
the circumstances.
MODERN TRENDS IN QUASI CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY IN
SALES CASES
There are two aspects in which modern trends in quasi con-
tractual recovery in sales cases are interesting:
First: As to the extent that quasi contract law has been
changing as shown by the cases of the last twenty-four years;
and
Second: As to the extent that the application of quasi con-
tractual principles is different where a sales case is involved from
where the subject matter is not a sales case.
Taking only the unjust enrichment branch of the law of quasi
contract, it would seem that the principles of recovery should be
the same regardless of the subject matter. The unjust enrichment
is the gist of the action and if it exists recovery should be allowed.
This has generally been true and the law of quasi contract has
been regarded as a generally harmonious body of law. If, then, a
discordant group of cases is encountered, it may represent a change
in the law of quasi contract and it may be a respect in which
quasi contract law is different in a sales case from what it would
be if the subject matter were something else.
There have been two such discordant groups of cases. One
was Situation B 11, where a buyer who rescinded for breach of
warranty or the seller's fraud was allowed to recover not only his
part payment of price but also expenses or damages incurred-the
recovery of the expenses or damages cannot be justified on any
doctrine of unjust enrichment because the expense or damage to
the buyer does not enrich the seller. The other was Situation B 12
where a buyer who rescinded after having disposed of a part of
the goods was allowed to recover what he had paid minus the
proportionate part of the contract price for the goods not returned
-this recovery violates the old rule that a party who wants to
rescind must restore the status quo.
1 49
149A change in the attitude of the law toward this situation is thown by
the fact that the restoration of the status quo is insisted upon in 2 Williston,
Sales, sec. 649 and in the Uniform Sales Act, sec. 69 (3), while the Re-
statement'2 Contracts, sec. 480 makes rather broad provision for a recovery
without such restoration.
QUASI CONTRACTS IN SALES CASES
The decisions in these cases may be dismissed as being merely
"wrong" decisions, but the number of them perhaps indicates that
two new rules of law are being created.
THE UNIFORM SALES ACT AS A CODIFICATION OF QUASI
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES
It will be observed, from reading the thirty-four situations
which constitute the main body of this article, that in five of them
the recovery granted by the court is provided for in the Uniform
Sales Act and that in the other twenty-nine situations there is no
applicable Uniform Sales Act provision, other than as contained
in the catch-all section 73. It would clearly be futile and unwise
to attempt to cover all the law on a subject in any statute and
least of all in a uniform act. The problem of how complete to
make a uniform act undoubtedly is one of great complexity, but
if a new uniform sales act were being drafted, the draftsman
might well consider the inclusion of some definite coverage of the
quasi contractual rights of the parties.
THE EFFECT OF THE ABOLITION OF THE FORmIS OF ACTION ON THE
LAW OF QUASI CONTRACT
If it were true that the law of quasi contract was created and
existed only because of the early forms of action and had no
substance other than that which arose out of the development of
common law pleading, then it would seem that the passing of gen-
eral assumpsit also means the passing of the law of quasi contract.
But this idea is based upon a misunderstanding. The plaintiffs in
the statute cases, judgment cases and tort cases sought an addi-
tional remedy to the one they already had-the plaintiff in the
unjust enrichment case needed a remedy, not having one of any
kind at the time-and the remedy of general assumpsit was given
in all four cases. All four cases were unique as a matter of
substantive law.
The law of quasi contract is spoken of as being the result
of the application of equitable principles, but this probably means
the principles of fairness and common sense justice, rather than
the technical principles of equity jurisdiction. The courts of
equity did not have jurisdiction to help the plaintiffs in these four
cases mentioned.
It is true that under code pleading we can satisfy the plaintiff
in the statute or in the judgment case by giving him an "action"
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under the code and the substantive law of statutes or judgments
is all that he needs. The plaintiff in the tort case, however, today
needs the quasi contract substantive law principle that a victim
of a tort can recover the amount by which the commission of the
tort has enriched the tort feasor, and the plaintiff in the unjust
enrichment case today needs the quasi contract substantive law
principle that he can recover the amount by which the defendant
has been unjustly enriched. Orderly thinking still requires a
distinction between the case where the plaintiff recovers on the
defendant's promise and the case where the plaintiff recovers on
the defendant's unjust enrichment.
The fact that the substantive law principles of quasi contract
are still needed does not mean that we must keep the term "quasi
contract." We can dispose of the plaintiffs in the statute and
judgment cases by regarding them as having substantive rules of
their own to rely upon. We can handle the tort plaintiff and the
unjust enrichment plaintiff by abandoning the term "the law of
quasi contract" and adopting the term "the law of unjust enrich-
ment." This is substantially what the American Law Institute
has done in the Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment.
We can change and abandon names-we can throw away old
tools and get new ones just as a carpenter does-but the work still
has to be done. Some may prefer the new tools to the old ones
and vice versa, but the substantive law of quasi contract has no
more been abolished by the passing of general assumpsit than the
substantive law of contracts has been abolished by the passing of
special assumpsit.
An idea of the present day 'importance of the law of unjust
enrichment may be gathered from the fact that the Restatement of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Tent. Draft, 1935 and Pro-
posed Final Draft, Part I, 1936) covers 581 printed pages.
THE ABSENCE OF DESCRIPTIVE TERMINOLOGY IN QUASI CONTRACT
CASES
The tabulation hereinabove presented shows that the courts, in
giving quasi contractual recovery in the sales cases covered herein,
used the expression "quasi contract" or a derivation thereof in
only 1.4% of the cases, that they used the expression "enriched"
or "unjustly enriched" in only .7% 'of the cases and that they
used language having some kind of a quasi contract connotation
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in only 27% of the cases. In 73% of the cases quasi contractual
recovery was given without the use of any quasi contract ter-
minology whatever.""
It is submitted that these figures show a respect in which the
courts have an opportunity to promote a better understanding,
by the profession, of the laNw of quasi contract. The courts might
make a particular effort, in quasi contract cases, to use quasi con-
tract terminology and quasi contract analysis. The Restatement of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment is about to be promulgated,
and, owing to the high standard of its preparation, it might well
form the basis for the future development by the courts of quasi
contract doctrine.
15
°Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, (1936)
I Mo. L. Rev. 223, 225 :-"Even in the grist of current judicial decisions
applying the doctrines of quasi contract, only a minority label them or
analyze them correctly; and for this reason it is all the more important
that the practicing lawyer should be able to recognize the thing without its
proper label."
